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ABSTRACT 
We address two problematic areas of cybernetics; nam. Analogical 
Problem Solving (APS) and Analogical Learning (AL). Both these human 
faculties do unquestionably require Intelligence. In addition, we point 
out that shifting of representations is the main unified theme underlying 
these two intellectual tasks. 
We focus our attention on the formulation and clarification of the 
notion of analogy, which has been loosely treated and used in the liter- 
ature; and also on its role in shifting of representations. 
We describe analogizing situations in a new representational 
scheme, borrowed from mathematics and modified and extended to cater for 
our targets. We call it k-structure, closely resembling semantic networks 
and directed graphs; the main components of it are the so-called objects 
and morphisms. We argue and substantiate the need for such a represent- 
ation scheme, by analysing what its constituents stand for and by 
cataloguing its virtues, the main one being its visual appeal and its 
mathematical clarity, and by listing its disadvantages when it is 
compared to other representation systems. Emphasis is also given to 
its descriptive power and usefulness by implementing it in a number of 
APS and AL situations. 
Besides representation issues, attention is paid to intelligence 
mechanisms which are involved in APS and AL. 
A cornerstone in APS and a fundamental theme in AL is the 
'skeletization of k_structures'. APS is conceived as 'harmonization 
of skeletons', 
ý 
The methodology we develop involves techniques which are computer 
implemented and extensively studied in theoretic terms via a proposed 
theory for extended k-structures. To name but a few: 
1. 'the separation of the context of a concept from the concept 
itself', based on the ideas of k-opens and k-spaces; 
2, 'object and morphism elimination' of a controversial nature; 
and 
3. 'conflict or deadlock or dilemma resolution' which naturally 
ar,, ses in a k-structure interaction. 
The overall system, is then applied to capture the essence of 
EVANS' (1963) analogy-type problems and WINSTOM (1970) learning-type 
situations. 
In our attempt not to be too informal, we use basic notions and 
terminology from abstract Algebra, Topology and Category theory. 
We rather tend to be "non-logical" (analogical) in EVANS' and 
WINSTON's sense; "non-numeric", in MESAROVIC (1970) terms (we rather 
deal with abstract conceptual entities); "non-linguistic" (we do not 
touch natural language); and "non-resolution" oriented, in the sense of 
BLEDSOE (1977). However, we give hints sometimes about logical deduc- 
tive axiomatic systems, employing First Order Predicate Calculus (FOPC); 
and about semiotics, by which we denote syntactic-semantic-pragmatic 
features of our system and issues of the problem domains it is acting 
upon. 
We believe in what we call: shift from the traditional 'Heuristic- 
search paradig, ' era to the 'An. alogy-paradigm' era underlying Artificial 
Intelligence and Cybernetics. We justify this merely by listing a 
number of A. I. ; orks, which Omploy, in some way or another, the concept 
V. 
of analogy, over the last fifteen years or so, where a noticeable peak 
is obvious during the last years and especially in 1977. 
Finally, we hope that if the proposed conceptual framework and 
techniques developed do not straightforwardly constitute some kind of 
platform for Artificial Intelligence, at least it would give some 
insights into ardilluminate our understanding of the two most funda- 
mental faculties the human brain is occupied with; namely problem- 
solving and learning. 
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AUTHORS NOTE 
This work makes no pretence of giving to the reader a new theory 
of our Intellectual operations, Its claim to attention, if it possesses 
any, is grounded on the fact that it is an attempt not to supersede, but 
to embody, combine and systematize and to look at from another angle at 
some ideas which have been either promulagated on the subject by specula- 
tive writers*, conformed to by accurate thinkers in their scientific 
Inquiries or are currently dominant in various research centres"'. 
To cement together the detached fragment of a subject, not 
usually treated as a whole, and to harmonize the true portions of dis- 
cordant theories, by supplying the links of thought necessary to connect 
them, must necessarily require a considerable amount of original spe- 
culation, 
In the existing state of the cultivation of the sciences and 
technology and especially in the not yet well established fields of 
cybernetics and general systems theory, there would be a very strong 
presumption against anyone who should imagine that he had effected a 
revolution in the theory of the investigation of human thinking, related 
intellectual processes and various brain activities, or added any fundamen- 
tally new process to the practice of it. 
The improvement which remains to be effected in the method of 
philosophizing can only consist in performing, more systematically, 
MINSKY, WINSTON, EVANS, PASK, MITCHIE, EILENBERG, McLANE, MELTZER. 
BOURBAKI, MESAROVIC, AMAREL, BARNDEN, BLEDSOE, KOWALSKI. 
,,,, ,, M. I. T., Edinburgh, U. S, S. R. 
accurately and methodologically, operations with which, at least in 
their elementary form, the human intellect in some one or other of its 
employements is already familiar; and these are, in the writer's 
opinion, the so-called analogizing activities. 
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1. 
CHAPTER I 
2. 
"When we mean to build, 
We first survey the plot, then draw the model; 
And when we see the figure of the house, 
Then must we rate the cost of the erection... ", 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 
3. 
1. ON SEMANTIC NETS AND CONCEPTUAL UNIVERSES 
1.1 ON KNOWLEDGE AND ITS SPECTRUM OF REPRESENTATIONS 
1.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Knowledge is a collection of 'facts' about some environment. 
According to the observer's (problem-solver's) viewpoint, the 'facts' we 
. are referring to may be considered and categorized as: conceptual 
knowledge, events or procedures for doing things. 
As far as knowledge Representation is concerned, a lot of efforts 
have been made to provide a unified schema. Again, here, almost every 
attempt is tuned according to the target aimed for. An exception, 
perhaps, is the so-called frame theory, MINSKY (1974). WINSTON (1977) 
defines representation as "a set of conventions about how to describe 
things". In the case of the above mentioned frame representation, the 
fundamental concept is that of frame. It is a data structure for 
representing a stereotyped situation; and we can think of it as a net- 
work of nodes and relations. A frame's terminals can specify the 
conditions their assignments must meet. Simple conditions are specified 
markers that might require a terminal assignment to be a person, an 
object or a pointer to a subframe. Complex conditions can specify rel- 
ations among the things assigned to several terminals. 
From the whole spectrum of representation alternatives, ranging 
from procedural descriptions to nonprocedural representations, we are 
going to deal with the latter region. There is no unique answer to 
questions like: how should knowledge be represented? Some knowlege 
is procedural, other knowledge is factual belonging to the right-hand 
end of the above spectrum of representational methods ranging from 
4. 
simple tables to complex frame systems. 
In the theory of knowledge there exist, at least, two main 
attitudes towards knowledge representation; nam. the declarative and 
the procedural schools of thought, accompanied, respectively, by two 
sorts of representation languages thus giving rise to the so-called 
declarative-procedural controversy. 
We generally assume that knowledge consists of concepts and relations 
between them; it is a hypothesis necessary for the development of 
representational tools towards Conceptual Universes, (conceptual) problem- 
solving and concept-formation/learning, themes we are going to study. 
Issues concerning with acquisition of knowledge are developed in 
the next chapter, sect. 2.2.1. 
1,1,2 OTHER SCHEMES OF KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION 
We are giving a brief overview of representation schemata rele- 
vant, more or less, to the one we introduce in a subsequent chapter. 
The exposition is accompanied by examples, whenever space permits, and 
in addition, we stress a few pros and cons of the schemata under 
comparison. 
The natural way towards k-structures is, we argue, the one which 
passes via semantic nets (SNs) and conceptual universes (CUs). These 
are the two main issues (, representation schemes) we are now going to 
examine in brief, 
Semantic nets or relational structures, as they are sometimes 
called, have been proposed by many people working in various fields, 
5. 
as knowledge bases, information (rather knowledge) representation 
schemes or conceptual structures, in a number of systems, with the 
purpose of performing a variety of cognitive activities. The popular- 
ity of semantic nets, is probably due to the fact that their diagram- 
matic representation 'triggers', somehow, the imagination of users or 
problem-solvers. Before we proceed with a few informal remarks on 
semantic nets, we quote from BARNDEN (1975): 
"Conceptual universes are variants of semantic nets specifically 
designed to cater for the definitions of the meaning of concepts 
in terms of structures of other concepts". 
Carrying on in this sense, k-structures, the representation 
system we introduce in chapter 3, may be considered, in some way, as 
variants of conceptual universes which cater for the study and develop- 
ment of: 
A, Useful mathematical properties about some aspects of the internal 
structure of CUs; nam, similarity, etc. 
Inherant (intrinsic) structural regularities in a CU which may 
facilitate problem-solving, in a situation which is representable as 
a CU (k-structure). 
C. Analogy relations between concepts based on, say, internal sym- 
metry of the representation scheme under question. 
D. How problem-solving behaviour is changed by assuming or supplying 
a specific constructive structure upon the set of relations 
linking the 
set of concepts. 
E. Operations between concepts and CUs. 
F. Mappings between CUs. 
6 
Remark. - It is this reason* D we are going to elaborate next, by briefly 
outlining a similar action initiated by WIýdDEKNECHT (1964), and adopted 
by MESAROVIC (1965), in the area of problem-solving and the modelling of 
a problem; nam. the assumption of a specific constructive structure 
of set F (functions between problem situations). 
1.1.3 ON A GENERAL MODEL OF CONTROL SITUATIONS 
An outline is given below, of the basic models that BANERJI (1969) 
is dealing with. In fact, MARINO (1966) proposed the following general 
model for control systems, problems and games. There are three sets 
given; 
S: states/situations; e. g. desirable or winning: WS C S. 
controls; elementary controls: EC C C. 
D: disturbances; elementary disturbances: EDC D. 
The control prob Zem then is, in antecedent-consequent form, 
as follows : 
Given: a situation seS 
0: 
_. 
Find: a control ccC such that for every disturbance 
dcD, c is paired with, the resulting situation 
to be a desirable or winning one. 
The control problem is reduced to the so-called "open-loop controller" 
by considering each control as a sequence of elementary controls and 
each disturbance as a sequence of elementary disturbances. 
Dominant motivation underlying the step towards k-structures. (More 
in the relevant chapter). 
0 is what we call theorem schema (we use 0 quite often); where, 
Y: antecedent or hypotheses and consequence. 
7. 
The difficulty which -arises, stems from the fact that every 
elementary control may not be applicable to every situation and this 
necessitates the shift from the control sequence notion to that of 
control strategy; the latter defined as: 'An initial decision on the 
control to be used at each situation at any time the situation arises'. 
You may find the concepts of 'decision-making demon', 'strategic 
advisor' and 'winning strategy' as relevant here. In fact, the above 
shift results on finding a winning strategy or 'closed-loop controller'. 
1.1.4 ON A MODEL OF PROBLEM SITUATIONS 
We now move from general models of control situations into special 
ones, Lie. models of problems situations. One of them, due to MESAROVIC 
(1965), may be stated, using the above format, as follows: 
Y 
Given: a set S: problem situations 
SD T: winning situations 
SH: starting situations; and 
} a set of functions F-{ fcF/f :S -*S 
o: 
E Find: an Fqx : HT, such that 3 tcT 
which : hi-+x(h) = t, VhcH. 
8 
We are not giving any proof or further analysis of the concepts intro- 
duced, for they are beyond the scope of our thesis. 
In fact, what we are going to do next, is to link the above models, 
both the general and the special one, to a previously made remark, 
sect. 1.1.2. MESAROVIC (1965) points out that the set of functions F, 
in order to be wiedly, tractable and controlled should be "constructi- 
vely defined". In his model for problems, WINDEKNECHT (1964) assumes: 
1, A specific constructive structure of F; nam. elements of F are 
obtained by composing functions from a finite set Fo of functions. 
2. The elements of Fo are partially defined over S, so that the 
composition operator defines a partial semigroup rather than a 
semigroup*. 
3. The set H of starting situations is viewed as singleton. 
BANERJI (1969) follows the above model with only one modification 
in part 1; i. e. Fo is not assumed to be a finite set. 
We shall close this section, leaving the details on the nature 
of problem-solving with the relevant sect. 3.5.4, with four general 
remarks: 
A. There are clear similarities between Marino's. Banerji's and GPS 
models of problems; BANERJI (1969), Ch. 
B. Marino's model of problems can be reduced to the model of a 
two-person game, BANERJI (1969), ch. 3. 
C. Banerji's model of a game is an automaton or a labelled directed 
graph; while VonNeuman's is a tree. 
D. Converting a game with incomplete information into a 'larger' one 
is analogous to converting a nondeterministic automaton to a deterministic 
On "partially defined automata! ' issue see CHERNYI-SPIVAK (1977). 
9 
one. (How? ). 
1,1,5 MORE ON SEMANTIC NETWORKS 
In an earlier section, we mentioned that knowledge is organized 
as a collection of facts, in the general sense of that term. Such 
factual, so to speak, knowledge can be conveniently represented in the 
form of semantic networks. A question which naturally arises here is: 
what is a fact? Let us assume* that a fact is a tuple (R, E), where 
R is a relation and E are entities the relation is connected with, in a 
meaningful way. 
In the same section, we also talked about descriptions. In 
general, a description will contain information about individual objects 
as well as information about how they relate to one another. Viewed 
in this way also, knowledge is nicely accommodated in a semantic net- 
work. Before giving an informal analysis of semantic networks, let us 
list other names given to them; nam. semantic nets, relational struc- 
tures, relational networks and so on. For our purposes we use the term 
semantic network (SN). 
SNs mean different things to different workers in various fields. 
They are variously realized as knowledge bases, information or represent- 
ation schemes, diagrams, abstract sets of n-tuples, data structures, 
lists of entities, and also information structures in brains. Generally 
speaking aa semantic net 
is a dLrected or undirected graph" in which nodes 
It is very important, from an epistemological point of view, to 
discuss the consequences of any assumption which is put forward. 
sºs: Thus semantic net theory is somehow linked to graph theory; 
HARARY (1965). 
10. 
stand for concepts and arcs for relations between concepts. Arcs may 
be labelled or not. Nodes in an SN, apart from general and particular 
concepts, may also represent descriptions of named objects, board 
positions, scenes, situations, states, events and so on, found in 
some environment, eg, linguistic, conceptual, problem-solving, visual, 
etc, Arc (link) types may be a designator of some relation(s) between 
objects in the specific environment or the name of some connection bet- 
ween nodes which are considered functionally useful. In a sense the 
node-arc organization of an SN reflects some environmental structure 
viewed from some particular standpoint. 
Before we give an example of a system, that of WINSTON (1970), 
which uses an SN** we would like to draw attention, once again, on the 
importance of choice of representation as a crucial issue, by simply 
mentioning three similar spectra for descriptive mechanisms. That is, 
1. Procedural-non procedural; WINSTON (1977). 
2. Analytic-network-axiomatic; R. BROWN (1977). 
3. State vector-relational structures - predicate calculus; MITCHIE 
(1974). 
1.1.6 AN EXAMPLE OF A SEMANTIC NETWORK 
WINSTON's (1970) relational structures (RSs). 
We are now going to supply reasons for the choice of WINSTON's 
method of knowledge representation. 
s. i. e. Control/problem/game situations. 
`#"y Actually a Relational Structure (RS). iº 
11. 
A. We want to demonstrate how 'factual' knowledge can be nicely 
accommodated in an SN. 
B. 2-D Figures and 2--D projections of 3-D scenes, employed (analysed) 
in his system, intuitively (visually), at least to us, bear similarities 
with the topology of SN diagrams. 
C. Operations and observations on relational structures in Winston's 
work have almost nothing intrinsically to do with scene analysis. The 
same principles (of his system) could be applied to areas such as problem- 
solving, for which we are mostly interested, as well as to linguistic 
analysis and so on. 
D. One of our objectives is to focus on a representation scheme in 
the, context of learning simple concepts from examples. 
We wish to show that RSs are good for descriptions of definitions 
(contexts) of concepts, main issue in our investigations. 
Finally, we point out that the foregoing 'sketchy' description of 
Winston's system misses out a lot of its important (for him) points. We 
shall be highly selective in referring to only those aspects which are 
of special interest for us. 
Winston's system is about how a machine can be taught to see and 
learn new visual concepts from carefully (for teaching purposes) chosen 
examples. The core of the system focuses on the problem of analysing 
scenes consisting of simple visual objects. From such visual scenes, 
viewed through a TV camera, a set of procedures find the objects of a 
3-D environment and determines a family of relations between them. 
Finally, an SN (RS) is built which facilitates better description of 
scenes. 
12. 
Sub-RSs match or partially match internal archetypal RSs, called 
models* which are learned rather than being a priori knowledge. A 
model is learned via a 'careful' teaching from examples and 'near 
misses' scene; RSs. Model-RSs differ from Scene-RSs* d 1. only in that arcs 
in models may bear modifiers. 
In the system's mode: 'Learning a model'*%ý, viewing an example, 
it builds the corresponding scene-RS, it then compares it with the 
current model-RS, it modifies it, and, finally it produces a new model- 
RS. 
f11" 
In the system's mode: 'Learning a scene'*, viewing a complex 
scene, it builds the corresponding scene-RS, it compares sub-scene-RSs 
with model-RSs, it modifies them by introducing 'emphatics' WINSTON 
(1977), it then sequentially builds: 
a: Skeleton-RS 
b: Difference description-RS 
c: Similarity network-RS 
Finally, it identifies input scene by identifying its sub-scenes. 
Next, a set of examples are given to illustrate the above- 
mentioned notions and system's modes. WINSTON 
(1970) and (1977) are the 
main sources. 
}; 
}; 
.a.. Il. ºIL 
. 
..:: 
Model-RSs are definitions of entities. 
Scene-RSs are descriptions of scenes. 
Or 'Learning a simple concept' mode. 
Or 'Learning a complex concept' or '(Learn to) identify a scene', 
since identification power should follow 
from a successful 
learning. 
ý 
13. 
ARCH 
L1/ Lt/ 
NEAR MISS 
Example 1 N 
Learning a model or simple concept, WINSTON (1977) 
,. 
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Example 2 
Learning a complex scene, WINSTON (1977). 
LL- 
rý r 
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1.1.7 MORE EXAMPLES OF SEMANTIC NET-LIKE REPRESENTATION SCHEMES 
Other systems we ought to mention here, being relevant to concepts 
which we refer to, are: 
1. LINDSAY (1973) 
He introduces the term of "Relational Contexts", as a way of 
looking at RSs. He studies: (A) "relation-preserving* maps* " between 
RSs (or within an RS; nam, what we distinguish, elsewhere, as shifting-1 
and shifting-2, sect. 2.1.3) and (B) regularities* in an RS as a basis 
for creating new relations (why not call them new concepts? 'Thus con- 
cept-formation is one result of his investigations). 
Lindsay's approach is based on a way of looking 'locally' at a 
structure; nam. from the 'neighbourhood of a node' standpoint, thus 
bearing close links with (and a. departure into) topological concepts. 
He also suggests and employs a definition of a context of a node x by 
introducing the notion of C(x): = "the set of all contexts of x". More 
can be found on "our topological views of an SN/RS/CU" in sect. 1.2.5. 
Remark 1. - Our treatment of the context of a concept'bears some sort 
of similarity to the notions just mentioned; but we are rather viewing 
them from a different angle. However, they have been, in some way, 
used as departure points; more in section 3.3.3. 
Remark 2. - The above made suggestion from LINDSAY (1973), intuitively 
led us to link up these notions here, to modules, etc. in abstract 
algebra, in the sense of HU (1965). 
The works of PAVEL (1976), TOURLAKIS--MYLOPOULOS (1973), LUGER (1975), 
TSICHRITZIS (1976) are very relevant here, for a fruitful departure 
on theoretical issues. Also, WIENER's (1961) Ch. 2 on invariant 
transformations. 
ra mori hism C- i f: nc t ion which 'preserves structure' -i -S 
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2. MOORE-NEWELL (1973)* 
They build a system, called MERLIN, for understanding and problem- 
solving, which employs a semantic network for representing knowledge. 
It is, also, one of the few papers addressing the process of analogy and 
how it can be involved in learning. A mechanism is developed which 
permits a new piece of knowledge to be constructed by transforming an 
old one, rather than just by specialization or generalization (WINSTOWs 
(1977) comment), Thus, this work is relevant to some extent, to what 
we will refer to as 'learning by analogy' and to the role of shifting 
of representations in concept formation. 
3, Finally, the work which is generally credited with developing the 
concept of an SN is QUILLIAN (1968). It is a system which contains an 
SN memory for factual knowledge which is used in the comprehension of 
an English text. 
Note. -- We are mainly interested for non-linguistic information repre- 
sentation in SNs^'; eg. WINSTON's visual knowledge. This is, in fact, 
the non-linguistic component of a manifold of our attitudes analysed 
in another section of the thesis under the label "on our attitudes". 
1,2 CONCEPTUAL UNIVERSES 
1,2,1 ISSUES ON CONCEPTUAL LANGUAGES 
In order to talk about concepts, concept formation/learning and 
related issues, a language is needed. Besides, "knowledge is 
More comments are to be found in Sect. 1,2.5. 
SCRAGG (1975) p. 25. 
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cumulative due to language" GEORGE (1973). A well known language of 
this type (esp. for conceptual analysis) is due to BANERJI (1969). 
GEORGE (1973) argues that: 
"The Language of concept formation he made, is designed for 
internal representation and for internal. Zogical and data processing 
but it is not necessary convenient for external communication 
between people", 
BANERJI's language is a set-theoretic one for describing patterns. 
It is based on the idea of a pattern recognition environment <U, P> , 
where U is an abstract set and P is a family of partitions on U. We 
are rather viewing a partition of a set as some kind of topologizing 
a set, in terms of DUGUNDJI(1966); in other words, partitions are 
the means for supplying an organization* to a collection of things. 
Set-theoretic descriptions are used by various workers; esp. 
the field of cognition. However, the issue of recognition, comming 
back to BANERJI, is mainly set theoretical and logical one. 
in 
The various schemes used by workers for concept formation differ, 
in a sense, in the methods employed, that is, statistics, linear algebra 
and so on. BP-NERJIIs (1969) description languages have as their 
motivation the Boolean algebraic structure of a class of concepts"Oý. 
Such languages are quite distinct from Natural languages. 
Finally, we mention that one of the motivations for a conceptual 
language is the need to transfer knowledge. Examples of such transfers 
:- In ASHBY's (1956) terms. 
Perhaps it is relevant here to mention another interesting language 
recently introduced by G. S. BROWN (1969) the so-called; laws of forms. 
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may be the following: 
11 Transfer of training; GEORGE (_1973). 
2. Transfer of problem-solving behaviour; LUGER (1975); BAUER-LUGER 
(1976); REED (1974) et al. 
3. Transfer (learning) of skills; i. e. vehicle/aircraft navigation; 
GOLSTEIN (1977), KOONCE (1974). 
Shifting between knowledge representations, Conceptual Universes 
or problem-representations which are introduced in Ch. 2, is a closely 
related issue to the above mentioned transfers. 
1.2.2 FIRST ORDER PREDICATE CALCULUS* (FOPC) vs. SEMANTIC NETWORKS (SNs) 
In this section we will make brief remarks contrasting some issues 
we think of importance between FOPC and SNs. The exposition is at two 
levels, nam. A: as representation formalisms** and B: as far as 
translation between the two formalisms is concerned. 
A. Generally speaking SN and FOPC are closely akin as forms of re- 
presentation and in representational power. Many workers in the field of 
Artificial Intelligence tried to show their near-isomorphism. They 
usually illustrate it elaborating on a number of examples or, at the 
most, proving equivalent some of the aspects of both two formal 
isms*%ýV: 
The question which naturally arises at this point is: If FOPC 
and SNs are, in some way, quasi-equivalent, why study 
SNs and not 
n KOWALSKI (197') and MMELETIS (1975)a. 
And also for certain classes of inference. 
"'"From now on referred to as A.!. 
%; ý` The argument may be supported by SCHUBERT's (1976) comment: 
"SNs proposed so far have expresively been weaker than PC". 
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concentrate on FOPC, which has a well-developed metatheory? BARNDEN 
(1975). 
Next, some points are described which elaborate part A of 'FOPC 
vs. SNs'. 
1, Factual knowledge can be conveniently represented in 'net-like' 
form as the one provided by SNs. Compared with 'linear-like' form of 
FOPC encodings of factual knowledge, SNs seem more understandable and 
natural, 
2. SNs and FOPC are, in some way, different views of the same 
Representation Language (RL); i. e. visual (intuitive) and formal 
(abstract) respectively. 
3, Expressing the RL in a tnet-like' form shows much more clearly, 
the structural features of a body of knowledge or of a problem, than FOPC 
does (at least to us). 
4. Besides, net form is useful in representation of problems in the 
sense of sects. 2.3.1 and 3.5.5. 
5. An SN representation leads, in some sense, to a straightforward 
computer implementation. 
6. Heuristic programmers found SNs more convenient for factual 
knowledge used. by natural language processing systems; and they are 
using them as 'graphical analogues of data structures representing 
facts'. 
7. From a psychologist standpoint, an SN is more intuitively 
appealing than FOPC's well formed formulae. 
8, From the computer scientist point of view, SNs aid both in the 
formulation and exposition of the computer data structures they 
resemble, 
20. 
9. In cognitive studies SNs are also used to advantage in the mechani- 
zation of forms of understanding as for ex. natural language, WINOGRAD 
(1972), and scene understanding, WINSTON (1970). 
10, Certain kind of deductive inference also appear to be facilitated 
by network-like representation. It is not surprising to discover that 
SNs implicitly provide a mechanism for inference for some situations. 
11! SNs seem to be quite economical in terms of storage required. 
12. One of the facts which gave SNs further impetus was the result of 
psychological experiments that implied that human information storage 
might also be of this form, QUILLIAN (1968). 
13. There is a lack of functional notation for networks analogous 
to that of FOPC, 
14,2-D graphs help us perceive the way relations are grouped together. 
We now focus in FOPC, FOPC was developed in an attempt to 
understand exactly what, it was that mathematicians were doing. Pure 
mathemticians prove theorems. FOPC was rigorously defined to help 
answer questions like: what is a proof? Also questions about correct- 
ness of proofs, and facts about FOPC itself, In fact, there is an 
extensive and well-developed metatheory for FOPC. 
Furthermore, FOPC provides a means for representing quantifiers 
and other concepts, not easily expressed in SNs. In fact, SCHUBERT 
(1976) develops a network representation which permits the use of n-ary 
predicates, logical connectives, unrestricted quantification, lambda 
abstraction and modal operators. We are not dealing with these 
concepts here. 
However, a disadvantage of FOPC as a data representation is that 
all of the knowledge concerning a particular concept 
is not necessarily 
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stored in one place. BARNDEN (1975) argues this criticism of PC as 
not a well-formed one, since there is nothing to stop an implementation 
of a PC formalism from having links between all the occurrences of a 
given concept, so that information about a concept is, after all, 
tightly bound together, and the implementation thus ends up with some 
sort of network. 
B. As far as the translation process between SNs and FOPC formalisms 
is concerned, BARNDEN (1975) introduces the notion of a GATE-NODE, which 
is applied as follows: 
11 An n-ary predicate P (xl, x2, n) is represented by a gate-node 
g, with an arc labelled PRED to a node representing the predicate P itself, 
and arcs with distinguishable labels to nodes representing the predicate's 
arguments xi, i=1,2, ..., n. 
2. For a function y=f (xl, x2, ..., xn) the representation 
is 
similar. The basic role is played by the node y and gate-node g. 
3. An expression involving logical connectives is also easily repre- 
sented in a SN form, For the one which specifically represented here, 
nam. X1Ax2 X3, by the gate node g2, notice that at the gate-node 
gl, which represents , the condition upon the argument arcs 
to be 
distinguishably labelled is weaken. 
4. Actions are thought of as predicates, and so are represented as 
in 
1. The example given here is "John broke the window with a 
hammer". 
The following four figures Fl, F2, F3, F4, give the SN-form of 
the corresponding cases. 
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F 1. P(xZ, x2,..., xn) 
F 2, y= f(xl, x2,..., xn) 
F3. X1A X2=*0 X3 
F 4. 
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We next give a list* (by no means exhaustive) of some crucial 
problems, workers in the field of SNs deal with, as far as net repres- 
entation is concerned. We do not study them in our thesis. 
11 N-mary predicates. 
2. Unrestricted quantification. 
3, Time. 
4, Lambda-abstraction. 
5. Modal operators. 
Variables, definition of relations. 
7, Referential opacity. 
8. Definite and indefinite descriptions. 
9. Definition. 
10. Composite objects. 
11. Functions. 
1.2.3 DEFINITION OF A CONCEPTUAL UNIVERSE 
A Conceptual Universe (CU) is a quadruple <Con, Typ, Str, e>, where: 
Con: finite set of concept-names; 
Typ: finite set of arc-types; 
Str: set of arc-strengths; and 
e; an expansion of Con in <Con, Typ, Str>. In an abbreviated form 
CU: = <Con, Typ, e>; where, Str = 0. 
Informally, a CU is a collection of concepts some or all of which 
have an image, an SN, under a definition map e. 
From BARNDEN (1975), 
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What a CU simply represents is a set of SNs% which, together with 
the corresponding concepts, form the pairs of an explicit or in extenso 
representation of the map e; nam. 
CUe E ,{ 
SN/SN: =e(c), ccCONCEPTS } 
Remark. - Taking into account that: CU = <Con, Typ, e> is a conceptual 
universe and K= (K, M, I) is a k-structure (to be defined in 
Ch. 3a question which intuitively arises is the following: 
'does e have something to do with 1, the identity function of a k- 
structure? ' 
1.2.4 CONVERTING A CONCEPTUAL UNIVERSE TO SEMANTIC NETWORK AND VICE- 
VERSA 
1. CUs ý--s SNs 
Assertion: Any CU can be transformed into SN form. There are 
more than one way of doing so, and one is described in BARNDEN 
(1975) p. 47. 
2. SNs-a-10 CUs 
Here also there are many methods to transform an SN into a CU. 
The choice depends on: 
A. The type of SN; and 
B. What sort of definitional characteristics of the SN, we wish to 
consider. In other words, from what standpoint are we viewing the SN. 
A method of converting an SN -) CU which is of interest for us, is the 
Finite SNs. 
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following: 
Step 1. Assign distinct concept-names to SN's nodes. 
Step 2. For each concept-name x define e(x) to be the context of the 
SN node n(x) labelled x; that is, the concept-names in e(x) are the 
concept-names for nodes in SN linked to n(x); the arcs attached to 
n(x) will induce dangling arcs in e(x). The result of this transforma- 
tion is the so-called context conceptual universe (CCU) and it has the 
important property that all pairs of concepts are homogeneously linked 
throughout the CU. 
Winston's (1970) system of model-RSs is a system of definitions 
which can be expressed simply as a CU. 
1.2.5 OUR TOPOLOGICAL VIEWS OF AN SN/RS/CU 
The notion of the context of a concept gives us the idea for a 
departure into the study of the 'environment' of a node of an SN, from a 
topological standpoint. That is, we want to look at various aspects 
of the surrounding structure of a node, its features and its role into 
functions between SNs which may represent some environments. After 
all, the topological structure of an SN/RS/problem-space, is that which 
is important in understanding, learning and problem-solving. A full 
analysis of topological considerations of an RS, and our views (and 
refinements made) to some existing schemes of context spaces, are given 
in the following chapters. 
We are next hinting at some existing definitions for context. 
LINDSAY (1973) looks at an RS and interprets regularities, on the 
basis of similar contexts, for inventing new relations. 
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If, S(X) is the set of relations which X starts; and 
E (X) is the set of relations which X ends; XeNODES, 
then, by looking from this limited aspect the surrounding of each node 
in the net, he tries to create new relations. He also defines C(x) 
to be the set of all contexts of X; where, a context is, either, a 
relation started by X, plus the end-node of the relation, or a 
relation ended by X, plus the start-node of the relation. 
Similarity (analogy) relations are inherently connected with ideas 
such as: 
A. Compare contexts; 
B. Discover maps mapping contexts into each other. 
However, we should notice that there are maps between a structure 
and its substructures or between substructures of a structure and the 
structure itself and there are relations (maps) between structures 
representing entities from different worlds (universes of discourse). 
MOORE-NEWELL (1973) consider a system for understanding and 
problem-solving having an SN as knowledge representation. One import- 
ant point is that each concept is given a set of alternative defini- 
tions; where a definition is the set of arcs and nodes a concept-node 
is attached to*. Thus entities in their universes are context-defined. 
This gives rise to view a concept C1 as another one C2 creating thus a 
relation: 
f1 
ab Jh 
V: CON x CON ---ý 'VIEWS' (or rather 'change-view level') 
: (Cl, C2) )V (Cl, C2): = 'Cl viewed as C2' 
i. e. The concept-node's immediate environment. 
Beliefs; similar, /analogical views; are relevant issues. 
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which is not symmetric. Thus, the important aspects of 'changing view' 
or 'looking a problem from another standpoint' related to shifting 
between representations, may be studied via 'contexts'. 
28. 
CHAPTER Z 
29. 
2.1.1 ON TOPOLOGICAL-ALGEBRAIC NOTIONS RELATED TO CUs, SNs 
The purpose of this section is to make some informal remarks 
on the continuity of CUs; functions, and maps between CUs; topology 4% 
and organisation of a CU; convergence, limits and so on, in the 
context of a CU and changes of CUs, i. e. change views, system 
beliefs, etc, mentioned in a previous section, 1.2.5. Some of the 
above issues are not extensively studied in BARNDEN's (1975) work. 
From topology, we recall that a function f: X 10 Y is continuous 
iff f(u) = UX where UX is an open for X's topology, i. e. UX cTx 
and UY eTY; that is, iff the f 
limage 
of aY -open is an X- open 
In other words, f: X--ai-Y is continuous iff it sends members of 
T. to T 's ones (and v. v. if, in addition, we want f- Y-X to 
YX 
be continuous). A Topology TX, on a CU X, is simply an organization 
of X's constituent entities. 
In section 3.5.5 we would refer to the notion of ANALOGY 
between two knowledge representation structure s'-* X and Y. as 
a function (precisely functor)*%% between them. Analogical 
Reasoning (AR) may be considered as the form of reasoning based on 
the use of analogy in its various forms. A reasonable constraint 
(from a cybernetic point of view, in terms of ASHBY (1956)) imposed 
on AR is the fact that the function or mapping between two 
Abbreviations for Conceptual Universes and Semantic Networks 
respectively. 
%-* In terms of DUGUNDJI (1966 }, p. 62. 
º%-**In BEER's (1972) sense; in fact he reads "cybernetics is 
effective organization of all available resources". 
SNs, CUs, CCUs or k-'structures (see Chapter 3) as the case 
may be. 
. ý.. ý. .... I ,,, _ __ _I___ ___. ý 
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representation schemes should be kept continuous. That is, some 
kind of continuity is required during the shifting of representa- 
tions from which analogizing intellectual activities are fulfilled. 
As a natural consequence of the remarks made so far, the 
notion of continuity of a function or map f between two structures 
X and Y is inherently dealing with the (somehow defined) topologies 
TX, TY of the two structures. 
If, on the other hand, we consider two topologies on X and 
Y*^, nam. TX/R1 and TY/R2, i. e. the so-called "quotient" topologies 
according to two equivalent or similarity relations R1, R2; and 
then we are able to establish a (1-1) correspondence a^ between the 
quotient topologies, then a* is continuous. (A proof of that may 
be found in a text on topology for ex. DUGUNDJI(1966). In 
schematic terms we have: 
a: 
a* 
TY .> 
S 11 TX/R1 1-i i Ty/R2 
.. .... 
Therefore consistent'' , complete. 
*4ý Analogical Reasoning may be 
s: SNs, CUs, CCUs or k-structures (see Chapter 3) as the case may 
be. 
In fact a: TX Ty induces two maps; nam. ä-P(X) -)Y, 
a1 P(Y) --r(X); where IP(. ) is the power set and 
ä-1 is used for the continuity. 
Skeleton (topology) represents in some way the 'maximum' 
topology which has this property of consistency. 
tics: On the possibiJ. -Ity of complete systems of 
inductive inference, 
I -. ý rt ý\ 
lilll.! )C. 
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somehow achieved via continuous functors between skeletons*. Where 
skeleton of X and Y is thought of as the substructure commonly 
shared by X and Y. To a skeleton SXY, corresponds a topology STXY- 
the so-called skeleton topology. 
Remark 1. - The above argument (and results) is more or less based 
on our intuitive reasoning and it led us to a number of speculative 
results. We are not dealing with them thoroughly in this thesis 
for a number of mathematical concepts are needed to be introduced 
which are off the main streamlines of the present work. 
Remark 2. - We are convinced that the 'separation of context' tech- 
nique, mentioned in section 3.3.3, supplies two representation 
schemes CU1, CU2 with such topologies appropriate for an effective 
study of notions of continuity and so on, introduced at the beginning 
of this section Finally, the topological notions introduced 
above lead to the important theme of shifting, which is central in 
our investigations. 
ý: 
ýn 
The notions of a functor and skeleton are made clear in 
the next chapter. 
i 
In other words, in order to achieve A. R. we must proceed 
through 'points' where the 'map' is continuous; 
i. e. via neighbouring points. 
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CLARIFYING SCHEMATOLOGY 
SXY PP 
/ *1ýý 
f 
N 
f: 
f*: 
XY 
11 Tx TY 
Pq 
TX/Rl TY/R2 
STXY 
TSXY 
The question which arises here may be stated as follows: 
'is the 
topology of the XY-skeleton (SXY) the same as the 
"Skeleton topology" 
of XY'? i. e. Ts 
XY 
= STXY ? 
p, q, pR15 pR2 , pp are proj ect-ions . 
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2.1.2 SHIFTING BETWEEN CUs 
The idea of shifting between CUs is introduced to make the 
static! notion of a CU, in representation terms, more operational 
and functional, In most of the cognitive (and a No of other) activities, 
we are familiar with some phenomena and expressions such as the 
following ones which appear very frequently: transfer of learning, 
knowledge, skill, methodology; change of opinion, beliefs, 
definition system; and, change of position, direction, point of view, 
outlook, attitude, policy or character. The very notion of shifting 
in its full generality, incorporates, represents and materializes in 
some way most of the above phenomena and everyday expressions. It 
thus cat ers for the unification and embodiment of their meaning. 
A Conceptual Universe has been informally introduced as a 
collection of concepts some or all of which have an image, a semantic 
net, under a definition map e; nam. e: CONCEPTS --- SNs. Thus, we 
have the following representation of a CU: 
CU -{ (c, e(c))/ccCONCEPTS, ea definition map} 
The notion of shifting between CUs may be well understood and inter- 
preted via the idea of a map or function f from a CU U1 to a CU U2; 
e. i. 
U2 f; U 
The concept of a map and the importance of continuity 
is stressed 
in ARBIB (1977), also see maps between spaces in ZEEMAN's 
(1951) 
-f-arms- for a connection to 
brain theory. 
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The raison dfetre of this interpretation is the following: it 
is our intention"to correlate the idea of shifting with that of a map, 
since it was this correlation which led us to conceptualization of 
shifting between k-structures, developed in the next chapter, as well 
as the concept of shifting in problem representations. We may 
distinguish and categorize two kinds of shifting in the context of CUs, 
nam. shifting-1 and shifting-2. 
2.1.3.1 Shifting-1 
Shifting-1 deals with the mapping between images of concepts 
(under the same definition map e), i. e. 
fl: --ý U Ue e 
Metaphor; an endomorphism in the Geometry world. 
2.1.3.2 Shifting-21 
It is about the shifting between concept images 
defined via 
different definition maps, el, e2 of the same CU, i. e. 
f21; U_ --} U el e2 
Such sorts of shifting are mainly concerned with 
changing the context 
of the same entities 
(concepts) which we are talking about. That is, 
two different topologies 
(organizations) upon the same set of concepts, 
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Shifting-2 2 
It is about the shifting between concept images defined via two 
completely different definition maps operating upon two different 
collections of concepts from different Universes of Discourse (CUs 
U1, U2), i. e. 
f2 
2: 
U1 --+ U2 el e2 
Such types of shifting reflect radical changes in view, or they may 
represent shifting between two totally different worlds: 
Remark l. - The case is interesting when e1 and e2 are of the same 
nature; thus we distinguish a particular subcase of shifting-2 2, 
nam. 
f2 21: Ul --} U2 ee 
Metaphor of shifting-2. - 
U1= G(X) := the set of all (1-1) mapping on aX 71 0 onto 
itself , 
e1: = the function composition (which implies some topology 
(organisation)) 
U2 =Z := the set of integers 
e2: = the operation of addition (which implies a 
topology on Z). 
We have chosen the above example to see how an (informal) theory is 
based on likenesses which one might observe in two familiar mathematical 
systems. The similarities in these two systems are incorporated in 
the formal axiomatic theory called GROUP THEORY. The primitive 
terms are: an unspecified set G, a binary operation 
1111 on G, and 
See R. BROWN ss (1977) work. 
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an element ecG. 
Remark 2. - We just mention here two works of interest and of some 
relevance to concepts developed herein, although in a different level 
of abstraction, nam. ZEEMAN (1962) and REDHEAD (1975). We do not 
elaborate on them, for they are cited only for reference and for a 
departure into theorizing on the matters involved here. 
2,2,1 KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION 
It is an issue as important as that of the knowledge represent- 
ation with which we have already dealt. It is a common belief in 
the scientific community that knowledge acquisition is acquired gener- 
ally in a twofold manner, namely: 
A. knowledge by description 
B. knowledge by acquaintance. 
Learning by description is, in a sense, 'wider' than learning by 
acquaintance - at least for humans. Thus, if the ultimate goal of an 
A. I. community is to build integrated cognitive systems which exhibit 
some sort of Intelligence, similar to some extend to that of humans, 
then systems' Artificial Inteligences must have learning abilities, 
more or less, analogous to the above mentioned ones. Some of the 
outmost capabilities that humans exercise are concept formation and 
learning. This naturally leads to the need of mechanization of concept 
formation/learning cognitive activities. However, there remain two 
problems, firstly, whether concepts can ever be other than a reorga- 
nization, reordering, recombination of existing concepts, and secondly, 
whether we can derive new concepts by enlarging our knowledge through 
37. 
acquaintance, GEORGE (1973). 
The references cited below* constitute a compilation of some of 
the existing approaches and opinions in the literature concerning four 
important topics, nam. concept formation, concept learning, concept 
filtration and concept amalgamation. Some of them are taken up and 
examined later on in the appropriate chapter, from a new outlook from 
that of k-structures. 
2.2.2 ON INTELLIGENCE 
In this section, we quote general remarks on the vague concept 
of Intelligence, which have been put forward by a number of people 
and end up by presenting a summary of our own views on this important 
notion. We attempt also to link it up with some concepts of primary 
importance for the present thesis, nam. problem-solving, learning and 
k'-theory. 
MINSKY (1961) reads: ". Intelligence is like depth in mathematics". 
The notion of Intelligence might be assigned to the capability of: 
"model building", AMAREL (1966), (1970); "using parables", PASK (1963); 
"steering the exploratory process by a sense of the proximity of a 
solution", MACKAY (1959)'"; "synthesizing a metaphor", LEATHERDALE 
(1974); "expressing an allegory", ARISTOTLE; "generating establishing 
and exploiting an analogy", KLIR-VALACH (1967); "sharing of experiences", 
R. STRAUSS in his opera Capricio. 
BANERJI (1969); CHAVCHANIDJE (1976); BARLADEN (1975); FUNT (1976). 
It also includes an excellent discussion on the distinction 
between 'Intelligence' and 'Intellect' 
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It has been conjectured, as TAN (1975) writes in p. 3, that 
Intelligence is a question of having a "big switch" which "efficiently 
connects particular domains with special methods", NEWELL (1973) p. 10, 
each method representing "expertise", R. BROWN (1977), in its own 
domain. 
We now focus into the second part of this section by presenting 
a variety of parallel, more or less, expressions on the concept of 
Intelligence. To us, Intelligence denotes a plegma of performances 
and their linkages, or a manifold of methodologies (tactics and 
strategies in execution) and their morphisms. If, on the other hand, 
somebody asked us how can we measure Intelligence? then, we should 
answer by the following (quantative) definition: "Intelligence might 
be measured by the degree of flexibility in shifting between appropriate 
(and relevant for a given task) methodologies and ways of thinking". 
Finally, to link up the concept of Intelligence with the tasks 
of analogical problem-solving and learning, investigated 
in the present 
work, we very briefly cite some of NILSSON's 
(1971) notions. For problem- 
solving, two are the main issues of great importance: 
(1) Representation 
of Knowledge (epistemological issue); and 
(2) Search (heuristic issue). 
The main problem-solving methods are: 
A. State space 
B. Problem reduction 
C. Theorem proving 
Now, Intelligence comes into consideration when we mainly 
talk about 
search methodologies, i. e. Intelligence concerns 
with heuristics 
involved in problem-solving programmes-, Simply saying, analogical 
See LENAT's (1977) impressive work on these matters. 
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problem-solving is a matter of attempting to solve a given problem on 
the basis of an analogy. In fact, analogical problem-solving is lar- 
gerly 'a matter of appropriate selection' based on analogical thinking 
and reasoning. By Intelligence attributed to an 'analogizer'*, we 
mean its power of appropriate selection on the basis of an analogy 
(or net of analogies). Works which are relevant here are: MELTZER's 
(1970)b, on power amplification for theorem provers; KLING's (1971) 
on the power of heuristic search process via analogy; and SACERDOTI's 
(1974) approach to augment such a power (of the latter kind). The 
essence of his approach may be summarized by the utilization of a means 
for discriminating between 'important information' and 'details' in 
the problem space. 
In conclusion, the original question in TURING's (1950) pioneer 
paper, "can a machine think"? may be narrowed down into the following 
"can a machine think analogously"? which according to previously made 
remarks may be rephrased as "can a machine select analogously"? which 
we think amounts to the mechanization of axiom of choice in mathematics. 
2.3.1. ON PROBLEM REPRESENTATIONS 
We now turn our attention on the issue of how to represent 
problems. It is widely recognized and accepted 
from workers in A. I., 
and related fields, that the main problem 
in their researches is that 
of problem representation. AMAREL 
in FEIGENBAUM (1968) p. 1023 
* Also a useful/practical heuristics. 
40. 
reads: 
"A man M, facing a problem ii, and trying to solve it 
with the aid of a machine p, he represents problem 
1f to machine u by providing such problem's knowledge 
which reflects his 'point of view' 11. 
The important assumption* that'effectiveness in problem-solving and 
decision-making is facilitated by looking at a problem from a variety 
point of view, is the main tactic which is used by COLES(1975), (1977); 
CARTER (1974); TSIPIS (1976); MASON (1969); SUSSMAN (1975) and other 
A. I. workers in their strategies and methodologies for problem-solving, 
conflict resolution, and other tasks in a variety of fields. If, 
on the other hand, we interpret the expression, 'looking at a problem 
Tr from two points of view: PV1, PV2' as 'shifting between two problem's 
knowledge representations: R1, R2, reflecting his points of view' then, 
the above mentioned hypothesis naturally leads%ýt to two crucial A. I. 
problems, nam. (1) shifting of problem representations, AMAREL (1969), 
(1970) and (2) its mechanization, AMAREL (1966), (1967), which are 
introduced in the next section. 
Problem Representation "^ (and the language for it) is crucial 
in the following two senses or contexts: 
1. As far as problem solution is concerned, the problem-solver 
4V 41b of the problem continuously provides various transformations 
in hand, until a successful, adequate matching, quite often to 
a previously solved problem, occurs. 
Also a useful/practical heuristic, 
Our attitude here justifies the main issue in Epistemology, nam. 
the importance lies on 'the consequences of the assumptions made' 
in posing (answering) problems (questions)'. 
Generally , representation 
is a set of conventions, assumptions 
of how to describe things. 
ýýýotýses and/or by enlarging existing LD 
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Schema 1 
Schema 2 
FIELD 
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2. In a semantic context, we have to distinguish between language and 
the objects represented by language. Language represents "a 
degree of abstraction", GEORGE (1973), p 415, from the reality 
described. And the question, which is naturally raised here, 
is; 'Are all the objects, involved in a representation, at the 
same level of abstraction or, otherwise expressed, "equally" 
abstracted? '*. The work of SACERDOTI (1974), (1975) on 
hierarchies of abstraction spaces might be though of as relevant 
here. Also, MINSKY's (1974) frames. The schema 1, 
is about "Lifted" (abstracted) objects (concepts) A. B, C, D 
which are mapped in four different levels of abstraction. 
Exale. - From the world-of arithmetic systems, the system of real 
numbers may be abstracted', conceptualized in a number of different 
ways, some of these are illustrated in schema 2. The 
arithmetic systems themselves, also taking as objects, are abstracted 
in different algebraic structures/languages. 
2.3.2 FROM PROBLEM REPRESENTATION TO ITS SOLUTION 
The implications of a representation of a problem to 
its solution 
is illuminated and elucidated in the so called: Interaction 
between 
problem-structure and problem-solving 
behaviour theme of many 
investigators; WINSTON (1972), LUGER (1975), GAINES 
(1976), 
p 
This question is also linked to epistemological 
issues. 
%ýý Enriched/structured. 
43. 
BAUER--LUGER, (1975), GOLDING-LUGER (1975), SIMON--HAVES (1976), etc. Let 
us illustrate some aspect of this interaction taking a concrete and 
well known example, that of EVANS (1963), on geometric--analogy problems. 
In this context, a useful heuristic he introduces (pp. 30) is the 
so-called intrinsic decomposition heuristic: 
"choose decompositions of problem representation into sub- 
figures which have as much as internal symmetry' (which can 
be defined in some precise sense) as possible" 
In other words, what it simply says is, extract, propagate, recognize 
and detect intrinsic features from a problem by introducing an 
appropriate topology (organization) to its representation (PAVEL 
(1976)). 
ý 
Under this choice, implied by the use of-the above heuristic, 
EVANS' procedure becomes: I 
(_INPUT FIGURE DESCRIPTIONS 
J. 
ýs 
DECOMPOSE FIGURE DESCRIPTIONS 
INTO ITS "CONNECTED"% SUBFIGURES 
COMPUTE PROPERTIES OF SUBFIGURES 
AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM 
COMPUTE SIMILARITY TRANSFORMATIONS 
ý_ 
STORE: SIMILARITY INFORMATION, for 
pair of figures 
DECOMPOSITION INFORMATION 
PROPERTY RELATION INFORMATION 
Z 
* This is where intrinsic decomposition heuristic is applied 
%% The raison d'etre of' the topological connectivity 
here has to do 
with the notion of continuity, we mentioned earlier, 
in the 
following sense: problem's solution is to be found via neigh- 
bouring points (subfigures). 
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As a final remark, we point out that fruitful results, as far as 
problem-solving is concerned, could be gained by studying the interac- 
tion between problem-structure and problem-behaviour, via analogical 
inductive reasoning; POLYA (1954). 
2.3.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERACTION BETWEEN PROBLEM-STRUCTURE 
AND PROBLEM-SOLVING BEHAVIOUR 
To stress, in another way, the importance and the wide impact of 
the above interaction, here is an example: where emphasis is given 
in some sort of analogy which exists between three Al. . domains 
(see schema). 
PROBLEM SOLVING 
Problem-solving procedure 
DOMAIN: A 
Conceptual Universe 
Cerebellum 
Y. 
Executive part of brain] 
DO1fiAIIN : 
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Some points of interest are: 
1. Symmetry in the structure of the cerebellum influences 
executive part of the brain and results Intelligence 
amplification, exhibited as intelligent behaviour; ASHBY 
(1956), p. 259, MELTZER (1970) a. 
2. Symmetry in the structure of search space influences proof 
procedure and results amplification of theorem-proving 
power; MELTZER (1970)b. 
3, Symmetry in the structure of problem solving space influences 
problem-solving procedure and results increase in efficiency 
of problem-solving abilities exhibited as a better problem- 
solving behaviour; LUGER (1975). 
The existing symmetry mentioned in point 1 is an exemplary 
indication of a "redundancy approach" taken from brain when 
faced -with new problems. 
5. Also the symmetry in point 3 may consider as a departure 
for a "Reduction approach to Problem-Solving", NILSSON 
(1971). 
6. In the schema, the interaction between problem-structure and 
problem-behaviour, indicated as bidirectional arrow a and 
monitored (via a P. S. procedure) by a' can be extended 
analogously in the other two domains B and C. 
46. 
2.4.1. INFORMAL INTRODUCTION TO SHIFTING (OF REPRESENTATIONS) PROBLEM 
We start straight away with a question which captures the 
meaning, consequences and scope of the notion under investigation, 
nam, 'how shifting of representations may be described and constructed 
during the course of solving a problem by analogy'. To analyse this 
question, a language L is required for representing the entities 
involved in its analysis. In fact, L may be thought of as a meta- 
language but we are not dealing here with metalinguistic issues or 
questions on self-reference languages as for example KLEENE (1952), 
SMULLYAN (1962) and so on, because such topics are beyond the scope 
of this work. 
Let mathematical structures*, in the general sense of the term, 
be, at the moment, the objects (primitives) of the linguistic descrip- 
tions we are going to use. Accordingly, then, to this phraseology, 
a shifting from a representation (structure Sl) describing a situation 
(problematic thesis el)ý, to another representation (structure S2) 
describing another situation problematic thesis 02 may be considered... 
as the job of some kind of correspondance d which relates". somehow, 
the two structures. Nam. 
6 Si --} S2 
For a formal definition of a (mathematical) structure see STOLL 
(1974) p. 146 and for relational structure ENGELER (1968). 
** In the case where we are talking in problem-solving terms. 
s. ** Rather, the shifting is embodied in Ö. 
Correlates, in AMAREL's (1967) terms, p. 98. 
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Before examining in detail Sys anatomy, we wish to mention at this 
point that the areas which are rich, from this kind of 'shifting 
activities', are: Analogical Problem-Solving (APS) and Analogical 
Learning (AL). In these intellectual processes the solver, or 
learner in the sense of KOCHEN (1974), continuously shifts his attention 
between analogical representations. This is one reason why we have 
chosen APS/AL to study, experiment and exercise shifting of representa- 
tions. We immediately proceed with an analysis of S; an informal 
introduction to PS/L and APS/AL is found in the appropriate sections. 
Remark,, 0 stands for OEa. s (Greek for situation, position); 
S stands for StiaAo'yos. Question: is 6 the. so-called heuristic 
connection that MINSKY (1961) speaks about? 
2,4,2 Vs ANATOMY* 
The nature/pattern of b, either explicit or implicit (in extenso 
or 2n intenso) is dependent mainly on the following factors. 
A number of constraints or conventions, possibly external to 
del' ý2'%ý%ý) system, with global, Universal or holistic implications; 
the otherwise so-called a priori choices or environmental impact. 
e. g., computer storage and time limitations to problem-solver; 
orthogonal topology of chess board; interval time 
in a chess tournment. 
Analysis/morphology/physiology, MONOD (1970). 
Where A stands for AÜTns : Greek for problem-solver. 
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Morphology, PIAGET (1970) of 61,62 structures. That is, what 
kind are the objects (and the relations between them) involved? This 
is very important, as it is pointed out for example in DRESHER- 
HORNSTEIN's (1976) criticism of MINSKY's (1974) frame theory, which 
is considered to be a unified theory for representation of knowledge 
and thinking. 
Local conditions that 6l, 02's constituents obey or satisfy; 
TOURLAKIS-MYLOPOULOS (1973) p 440. 
Physical characteristics and/or individual, atomic properties 
of 0 1,02 
's objects; (FLINT (1976)), e. g. nature of chess pieces. 
Value l, colour 
2, 
weight 
3, 
meaning 
4, 
strengths of 61, A2's 
relations: 
1 either fuzzy or not; GAINES (1976), 
2 STEPHAN-SIEKMAN (1976), 
3 LARSON (1974), 
4 WINSTON (1970), 
5 BARNDEN (1975) arc strength. 
Motivations, beliefs, intentions and indiosyncracy of problem- 
solver X. In other words A's philosophy or world model or pcnt of 
view. 
Nature of composition(s) between relations; i. e. how relations 
can be synthesized. 
Nature of operations that are going to be performed by X, 
e. g. inference rules in an axiomatic system. Legal moves a chess 
player can perform on the pieces. 
Current state of activity--field affairs during the course of 
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problem-solving. Namely, form of current problem-situation (problem 
thesis 0) i. e. "the way it is represented or described. 
X's knowledge about the problem Tr in question or the class of 
problems that ii belongs to. 
X's epistemology (know how). That is, how does X know what he 
thinks he knows? This is, perhaps, partly incorporated in what now- 
adays A. I. community calls: procedural knowledge; HEWITT (1971), 
(1972), i. e. procedures of how to do things. 
X's capabilities, that is: 
A. Logical: deductive, inductive, etc. 
Non-logical: analogizing; EVANS (1963), KLING (1971), SLOMAN 
(1971), etc., use of diagrams; FUNT (1976), BROWN, F. 
(1976), etc, Common-sense; McCARTHY (1959). 
Intuitive; SLOMAN (1971). 
B. Inherited, hitherto a priori knowledge. 
C. Learnable, attainable, acquired. 
X's performance history. An aspect which is immediately connec- 
ted with psychological issues. 
X's Intelligence. To me, intelligence denotes a plegma of 
performances and their linkages, or, the degree of flexibility in 
shifting between methodologies to meet a new situation. For a 
discussion on this issue see sect. 2.2.2. 
Methodologies available to X. That is, various off the shelf 
techniques, tactics, policies, heuristic demons, advices 
* LENAT (1977). 
And representations. 
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Available hint-list relevant to problem in question. 
The level ß of detail, complexity that A is going to pursue. 
plays important role in the analysis of the interaction between 
problem-structure and problem-behaviour. 
The level a of abstraction he is going to represent things. 
What goal is to be achieved. 
Some of the above may be incorporated in our favourite 
theorem-schema 
knowledge 
problem in question (its hypotheses) 
assumptions made 
0: 
I goal 
2.4.3 ON TWO SORTS OF SHIFTING 
We may distinguish two kinds of shifting, nam. 
Shifting between representations, and 
2. Shifting between methodologies. 
The first one, declarative (epistemological) shifting, is 
mainly found between knowledge representations, or problem represen- 
tations describing problem- s ituat ions, (problemat ic theses). In EVANS 
(1963), geometric analogy problems, for example, we have either 
[[A: 
B] as 
ýC. X, ] ---ý 
[[A 
. B] as C: X 7 
or 
B] 9' [C: Xk] 
where ": " symbolizes the expression 
"... -is to... " or "... is related 
to, See also sects. 3.5.6., 3,5,9,, i37; d 3.5 . 10 
or 
ý 
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The second one, heuristic shifting, so to speak, is concerned 
with methods, tactics, strategies. Here is where the concept of 
Intelligence (Sect. 2.2.2) really comes in. 
The reason underlying this sort of differentation between the two 
above described shifts is mainly a picturesque one. It is really 
difficult, if not impossible, (meaningless) to separate between 
representations and methodologies. 
In some integrated manner, this sort of interlocking (inter- 
linking) between representations and methodologies, 
may nicely be embodied in what we call epistemological -heuristic 
interaction: <E-H>. <E-H> is the functionality which captures, 
materializes an epistemologically-heuristically adequate shift 
McCARTH-HAYES (1969), SLOMAN (1971), SACERDOTI (1974). 
We think it appropriate here to intervene the foregoing dis- 
cussion with some comments on the very issue of Epistemology. Let 
us put them in question-form, epitomizing what we mean by this term. 
A. How do we know what we know? 
or to be a little more precise, 
A'. How do we know the representation of reality we think we know? 
We must leave any further discussion on these issues, otherwise, 
we will have to enter the vast field of Philosophy. 
Finally, we ought to mention two main problems associated with 
the above categorization, taxonomy of shifting. Namely, the 
frame 
problem and the search problem resp.; see RAPHAEL 
(1970), NILSSON 
(1971). 
If such a thing exists, which is doubtful. 
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2.4.4 MORE ON SHIFTING OF (KNOWLEDGE/PROBLEM) REPRESENTATIONS 
We analyse some issues by posing a number of questions. 
2.4.4,1 Question 1: Why is such sort of shifting necessary to be 
studied, analysed? 
As we mention in section 2.5, on our attitudes', one of them is 
to view induction from a non-statistical standpoint. This is a radi- 
cally different approach contrasting with the traditional probabilistic, 
statistical one which has been taken in most previous A. I. attempts 
to tackle induction. This tendency rests upon the redundancy assump- 
tion due to SIMON-SIKLOSSY (1976). We quote: 
rý... In a highly redundant world, coincidences never happen 
(or hardly ever happen! ). If two structures match, and 
match redundantly, it can be assumed safely that they are 
re Zated't 0 
To some extent, the notion of redundancy is loosely associated to 
ergonomy in the broad sense of the term. In the case of Conceptual 
Universes, where abstract entities (i. e. concepts, thoughts and so on) 
are involved, we intuitively introduced an analogous notion; that of 
skeptonomy (Greek for"'laws of thought = skepsis"). By this term, 
we mean a set of assumptions, principles and rules, under which a 
human problem-solver by using, directing the executive part of his 
brain, he carries out, intellectual tasks in the most efficient/ 
economical manner, i. e. using the minimum number of thoughts and 
thinking power in order to achieve a new goal. In fact, a 
brain 
It is rather important to investigate the implications to A. I. 
of theduct _'o-. U., 4' thout statistics approach based on 
this assumption. 
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(a healthy one) in its employements tends to maintain some kind of 
stability ZEEMAN (1961), equilibrium GEORGE (1973), homeostasis 
ASHBY (1956), BEER (1972) of thoughts. We generally assume that the 
brain of an intelligent organism has some sort of tendancy to choose 
the quickest way to solve, get around problems, via intuition, 
common sense and perhaps other means. A detailed account of various 
brains issues, is given in GEORGE (1973). We are not further 
concerned here with them for they are beyond the scope of our thesis. 
To substantiate the argument which follows from question 1, we 
assume that one of the human aims, during the course of carrying out 
intellectual activities (even everyday ones) is 'the unification and 
effective utilization of (relevant to,,. ) thoughts' (- Cybernetics 
of thoughts) and that is another interpretation of the term recently 
introduced and which we label skeptonomy (or skeptonomics). 
Besides, another reason which led us to the introduction of 
this term is the shift from the notion of mechanical/labour work 
to that of thought and thinking which underlies WIENER's (1961), 
pp 27, two types of revolutions, nam. the first industrial revolution 
which was "the devaluation of the human arm by the competition of 
machinery" and the second/modern industrial revolution which is 
"similarly bound to devalue the human brain" in WIENER's terms. 
* See also "conceptualization of learning as the stable growth 
of wisdom" by KOCHEN. 
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2,4.4,2 question 2; How can such shifting be described (represented) 
04, and synthesized (constructed) ? 
The first part of the question may be faced in a two-fold manner, 
nam. using the same language as the one for representation or using 
some kind of metalanguage. The latter alternative may be taken as a 
necessity due to the fact that, dealing with shifting between represent- 
ations, it is required to talk about entities that do not belong to 
the representations themselves but it is needed to refer to something 
in between them. This step, that is from representations to the 
shifting between them, bears some similarities, loosely speaking, to 
the step of going from the Propositional Calculus to the Functional 
Calculus, where constants are replaced by variables and function 
symbols are introduced. 
As far as the second part of the question is concerned, the cons- 
tructive one so to speak, one is forced to use control concepts. That 
is, a control/command language is needed to direct the decision making 
at the 'shifting level'. 
The above differentiation of the question in two parts 
is ass- 
ociated with or, lead naturally to, the current 
debate in A. I.; that 
is, whether to separate or not the control language 
from the repres- 
entation language, KOWALSKI (1974). The question 
is also related 
to the so-called, in the A. I. community, declarative-procedural 
controversy. 
Constructions make use of definitions/axicros/models. 
%ý-ý Carried out/executed/demonstrated/proved. 
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The methodology we employ to cope with and facilitate such 
description-construction pair is based on the very notion of 
analogy; namely, by exploiting a kind of similarity, precisely 
defined in the next chapter, between representations labelled under 
the Skeleton name(to be also analysed in the next chapter) and 
represented with more or less the same means as the parent repre- 
sentations. 
The (problem) domains we are delaing with or getting examples 
from, throughout the work, are mainly the following: 
Geometric Structures, 
Scenes, 
Problem situations, 
Conceptual Universes (semantic Nets, Relational Structures). 
Question 3: What kind of processes are involved in shifts between 
representations? 
Originally, this question was put forward by AMAREL (1970), pp. 
215, Since one of our tendencies is to use a high degree of redundancy, 
then some processes we can realize, at the moment, are of the nature 
of eliminating objects (and/or relations). That is, concepts 
in the 
case of conceptual Universes; (problem) situations in problem spaces; 
and (physical) objects in the case of geometric structures or scenes. 
The above attitude naturally leads to the notion of: 
1. reduction of representation's complexity; AMAREL 
(1967), 
2. sub-universes; BARNDEN (1975), 
3, sub--spaces; NILSSON 
(1971), and 
functions Coperations) which achieve them. 
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Our investigations show that, in fact, (as shown in the next chap- 
ter) these processes we speak of involve (result on) object/ morphism. - 
elimination, filtration ý (and its variant forms) and amalgamation. 
Question 4: How feasible, in a Heuristic-Epistemological sense, is 
the shifting of representation? 
This issue has been discussed by a number of people, 
McCARTHY-HAYES (1969), SLOMAN (1971), RAPHAEL (1970), SACERDOTI 
(1974). Most of the question is associated with the well-known 
(but difficult to cope with) fume-problem; RAPHAEL (1970) and other 
workers discuss it. 
An attempt is made here to analyse the feasibility for an 
Epistemologically-Heuristically (E-H) adequate shift, which is absent 
from SACERDOTT's (1974) system, as he points out, p. 117. This effort 
would amount to the discovery of criteria governing Epistemological- 
Heuristic interactions <E-H>%; e. g. in problem-solving like processes. 
As such, for example, may be criteria and conditions of disturbing 
the similarity (symmetry). We should call these disturbances 'noise 
morphisms, objects'. '*' The interesting question here is how can one 
invoke, detect and cope with such 'disturbance information'. However, 
one has to be very cautious for , as has been stated 
(argued on 
. J.. '. 
(E-H) adequate shift issue) by some people*.: "there is no way for 
an adequate representation", BANERJI (1969), p. 167. But, who knows, 
ý: Both are the basic constituents of what we call k-structures, 
defined in the next chapter, 
Notion which is introduced in an earlier section. 
s: %ý%ý "Conflict causing" objects/morphisms. 
... q. 
;; c1 174; "there is no best description MESAROVIC (1970. , p, 
for a given problem nor there is a best solution process". 
/ý 
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at least we cannot prove it, there it might be for shifting between 
representations: 
Question 5: What is a permissible shifting? 
A question which rises after a criticism made by DRESHER- 
HORNSTEIN (1976), that MINSKY (1974) neglects this point in his 
"theory of frames" when he is talking about "transformations". 
Question 6: What are the conditions for shifting? 
Question 7: What are the subproblems nested in the shifting of 
representations problem? 
2.5 ON OUR ATTITUDES 
During the course of developing our ideas, we take the following 
views: 
A. NON-LINGUISTIC FORMS for knowledge representation, PYLYSHYN (1975), 
WINSTON (1970), (1975), (1977). By this term we mean a representation 
of a given or wanted situation in which facts, procedures, problems 
(or whatever) may be involved. The form of representation 
is not based 
on grammatic rules, as for example in: First Order Predicate 
Calculus 
(FOPC), KOWALSKI (1974); formal languages, ENGELER (1968); natural 
language, WINOGRAD (1972); and so on. It rather rests upon some 
sort of diagramnatic* or network-like type. 
Here, the dominant 
'' Which is also a kind of language. 
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features are: nodes and relations between them, or in our actual terms: 
objects and morphisms. 
We think it is worthwhile to put forward the controversial 
question: "Why is FOPC or any other formal language the appropriate 
form of knowledge representation, for say, problem-solving? "' 
MESAROVIC (1970); versus: "Do we need images, analogues, diagrams 
(. in general, non-linguistic forms) in representing knowledge? " 
PYLYSHYN (1975), SLOMAN (1975), FUNT (1976) p. 125. From these 
questions the latter one implies to ask ourselves the following 
question: "To analogize or not to analogize? " which we have put 
forward in a similar manner as PAPAIKONOMOY (1975) who asked: 
"To model or not to model? ". 
B. NON-LOGICAL reasoning. To that label we assign forms, tools 
for reasoning other than the traditional formal ones (logical, deduc- 
tive, etc. ), namely, analogical, intuitive, common-sense, use of 
diagrams and images and so on. 
Our main concern is that of analogical mode of non-logical 
reasoning, similar to the one which has been studied by various workers: 
EVANS (1963), WINSTON (1970), SLOMAN (1971), (1975), KLING (1972), R. 
BROWN (1977) and others. 
We view the concept of analogy as some kind of heuristic aid, 
in Problem-solving and Learning situations. This attitude towards 
Notion which should label the thread used by Theseus to find 
his way out of the labyrinth and which has been given to 
him 
by Ariadni, the 'interface' so to speak, between Theseus 
and Daidalus, the engineer of King 
Minos. 
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the use of analogical forms of reasoning has been partly neglected by 
A, I, researchers (apart from the above mentioned) in the last twenty 
years or so, despite a number of suggestions put forward by eminent 
people in the A. I. field, such as MELTZER (1970)a, MINSKY (1961), 
AMAREL (1966), FEIGENBAUM (1968), and the urgent suggestion made by 
BLEDSOE (1977) in his recent paper on what he calls non-resolution 
theorem-proving, 
Recently, there has been growing interest in various A. I. 
centres in the use of Analogy and a number of researches, in different 
problem-domains, have emerged. We now list some works, in addition 
to those mentioned above: BLEDSOE (1977), GOLSTEIN-GRIMSON (1977) 
WINSTON (1977), LENAT (1977), MUNYER (1977), ULRICH-MOLL (1977); 
and also, KLING (1971), MOORE-NEWELL (1973), MINSKY-PAPERT (1974) 
REED (1974) et al., HESSE C1963), LEATHERDALE (1974), MINSKY 
(1974), and PASK (1963). 
Finally, we classify two forms of reasoning from 'proof' point 
of view. Namely: 
logical ---, demonstrative 
(resolution-like) POLYA (1954), 
vol. 1, p. VI. 
non-logical--to plausible (non-Resolution-like) e. g. common-sense 
reasoning, McCARTHY (1959), BLEDSOE (1977). 
C. NON-NUMERICAL problem solving attitude, in the sense of 
MESAROVIC (1970). 
D. NON-STATISTICAL INDUCTION. Attitude inspired from SIMON- 
SIKLOSSY (1976). 
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2.6 MOTIVATIONS 
Comparisons' of structures has always been the main methodology 
of mathematicians for the study of properties of structures and simi- 
larities between theme Because the invariant, inherited" features 
are those which characterize, underlay and govern the nature, behaviour 
of a structure and suggest reducibility, BARLADEN (1975), and redundancy 
(problem-reduction, NILSSON (1971)). which are useful in problem- 
%ý %ý solving'. 
In cybernetics, the comparison of structures (viewed as systems 
organizations, automata or whatever), is widely presence and becomes 
the central theme of it; ASHBY (1956), for example, studies isomorphic, 
homomorphic machines/systems. Besides, the nature underlying WIENER's 
well known ingenuity, was based on his ability to compare quickly and 
effectively various problem-areas and to provide a new problem with 
(at least) one solution. 
Comparisons occur, especially in analogical problem-solving, 
where an interrelation311 interlocking'l GEORGE (1976), of the current 
problematic thesis (structure 61T ) to a problem-solving methodology, search 
or selection strategy iQ, continuously takes place. This type of 
'problematic-thesis to problem-solving methodology' interaction 
(interrelationship or communication) may be loosely illustrated in a 
ý: 
..,. ý... 
... ".. +. 
Generally, various sorts of mapping between structures. 
Also the internal symmetries. 
Detection of invariants/equivalences are to be 
found in 
TOURLAKIS-MY OPOULOS (1973), PAVEL (1976). 
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manner more or less similar to a schema proposed in MELETIS (1975)a, 
which involves some kind of feedback. That schema was a modification 
of another one suggested by KOWALSKI (1974), including FOPC notion. 
However, as it recently turned out, feed-forward is another important 
cybernetic notion which may, somehow, influence the schema. In that 
case, the compututations now involved may be labelled 'look-ahead 
computations', KOWALSKI (1975). 
Returning to an issue presented earlier in this section 
regarding the analogical problem solving, the following questions 
arise: 
Question 1: Why has analogy been chosen? 
Question 2: How does the problem of shifting of (problem) represent- 
ations fit into cybernetics? 
Question 3: Why analogical mode of reasoning? 
Question 4: How does the analogical mode of reasoning fit into 
cybernetics? 
In the argument which follows, we try to give some kind of 
simultaneous brief answers to these questions. 
Firstly, the mode-of problem-solving, based on analogical 
reasoning, provides a fruitful paradigm, appropriate 
for elaboration 
in a cybernetic plateau. The main reason 
is that analogical problem- 
solving involves shifting of problem representations, 
AMAREL (1968), 
ý: For an additional characteristic of 
feedback, not found in classical 
numerical situation, that 
is, the change of problem descriptions' 
or shafting, see pp 1731174 
MESAROVIC (1970). 
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MESAROVIC(1970), NILSSON (1971) p. 35, which is one of the main 
objectives of the present work. This point may be, somehow, implied 
from the following beliefs (as fairly general comments) about 
cybernetics, namely: 
it Epistemologi. cally'-Heuristically, cybernetics could be thought of 
as the (meta-) science* (art) of study (manipulation) of various kinds 
of morphisms (relations) between various types of conceptual objects 
(facts) 
2. Pragmatics of cybernetics (or what is the use of it). Cyber- 
netics' methodologies can be used as an investigating, research tool 
for the discovery (generation) of parallelisms among the components 
of the triple: <machines, brains, society>- via the use of some 
(which one? ) mathematical language, in order to establish better- and 
more effective functional operations among the triple's parts. 
Secondly, following this two-fold view about Cybernetics, 
we think that the study of analogical reasoning and the related 
mechanisms, yielding the creations, realization, recognition... 
of analogies, could leads us, hopefully to the correct way of 
..... 
achieving, exhibiting, attaining--* this sort of (Artificial) 
Intelligence, (key theme, by all means, in cybernetics), which is 
attributed to creative /productive" thinking (why? and how? ). 
ý: 
.... .... 
Which cuts accross sciences. 
Other characterisations of cybernetics, found in the literature 
are scattered throughout the thesis. 
... .... 
:ýº; MINSKY (1963), PAVEL (1976). MINSKY (196-0). 
. ý. J. 
ý. J. ý. 
. mim 
imsmim 
"''' WERTHEIMER (1961). . ". f" ."'"" 4% " MINSKY (. 1961) . mý"" 
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Thirdly, we quote AMAREL (1969): 
"advances in the general area of modelling by a 
machine will come from a better understanding of 
processes of reasoning by analogy". 
Finally, we try to give an answer to the question: Why is it 
worth solving the problem of 'shifting of representations' via 
analogy? It is our desire to investigate and experiment mainly with 
analogizing (intellectual) processes. We believe their study might 
give some insights and hints towards the answer to the above problem 
of shifting of representations in problem-solving (and learning) cases, 
with applications not only for the problem-solving (and learning) 
mechanization, but also for intrinsic themes of Artificial Intelligence. 
For example, concept formation/generation/learning, inference making 
by induction, learning (mathematical) structures, and to 'problematique' 
of cybernetics, nam. design of intelligence robots, automated 
management systems, kybernetes of complex systems and creative 
problem-solvers. 
2,7 OBJECTIVES 
1. Lack of a clear mathematical description of analogy structure, 
neglected in KLING (1971), as he points out in p. 177, led us to the 
need of introducing and devising such a description (developed in 
Chapters 3 and 4) using a framework of k-structures (cited in 
Chapter 3). 
PULATOV (1972), GEORGE (1976). 
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2. Clarification and elaboration of the, in some ways, obscure use 
of objects and transformations referred to by EVANS (1963), attempt 
to formalize and elucidate his problem-solver for geometric analogy 
problems, and study the representation and solution of problems 
from the same domain using k--structures. 
3. Another aim is to systematize some aspects of WINSTON's (1970) 
work on 'learning structural descriptions by analogy'. His ad-hoc 
skeleton formation process is replaced by. a rationalized one. 
4. . Investigations on mappings between k-structures in order to 
throw some light on issues, such as mappings between Conceptual 
Universes (CUs), between Semantic Nets (SNs) and between CUs and 
SNs, which are only briefly mentioned in BARNDEN's (1975) work on 
Conceptual Universes. In addition, to manipulate and implement, 
though in a different mathematical framework, some of his interesting 
theoretical results. 
5. We make an. effort to introduce basic notions of Eilenberg- 
McLane's Category theory* as it is described in HU (1965), into 
cybernetics (and its main branch of A. I. ) towards 'standardization 
of a communication languageft among cyberneticians' with the ambition 
of partial resolving the existing 'conversational chaos'. However, 
serious attempts to insert Category theory into the closely related 
area of Computer Science, have already been started with a series 
called "A junction of Computer Science and Category Theory" by 
GOGUEN et al. (1973). 
ARBIB-MANES (1975): "... it is category theory rather than set 
theory, that provides the proper setting for the study of 
foundations of mathematics". 
?,. MESAROVIC (1970), p, 174,17`. 
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6. Attempt to throw some light on the mechanization of shifting 
of (problem-) representations, for "it is strongly relevant to the 
future progress of intelligent problem-solving systems", AMAREL 
(1969), p, 97, 
7. Effective handling of the phenomenon of morphism/object elimina- 
tion towards the resolution of conflict, deadlock and dilemma situa- 
tions, occurring frequently in decision-making and problem-solving 
processes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
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""0 Aristotle! If you had had the advantage of being 
'the freshest modern', instead of the greatest ancient, 
would you not have mingled your praise of metaphorical 
speech, as a sign of high intelligence, with a lament- 
ation that intelligence so rarely shows itself in 
speech without metaphor - that we can so seldom declare 
what a thing is, except by saying it is something else? 
GEORGE ELIOT 
The Mill on the Floss 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 ON k-STRUCTURES 
3.1.1 A LOCALITY OF ALGEBRAIC STRUCTURES (Meletis (1974) p. 152) 
Diagram illustrating interrelationships of different algebraic 
concepts 
Sets 
Set operations 
Union 
Intersection 
i i I 
Complementation 
Mapping 
Partitions 
Relations 
Equivalence relations 
Lattice theory 
Boolean algebra 
Systems with 
Jsemioup 
one operation o 
a closed associa- 
tive operation Y 
introduced on a JMonoid 
set SI 
Group r-- 
belianý 
group 
Every element 
bas inverse 
Systems with two 
operations o and c1. 
q closed associative 
operation introduced. 
&o are distributive 
Ring 
introduced 
o commutative 
Free 
I Semigroup',. 
Cosets, posets 
--Invariant subgroups 
Quotient groups 
Ideals 
ni . for f Tli ý-FPrPnrp rings i Lila va ýýýý`^_-_A-0 
_ý 
St=S- eo with operation ti 
is a semigroup 
S' with operation a 
is an abelian group 
- -- - -. 2*Galois field 
ILI - --- -ý nuwnber: ý 
ýr- _ _ý 
0 Identity element `O 
Y_ 
ý -- - 
-Integral 
domain 
, 
FF-i eld 
; real numbers 
i--- ---" i Operations on elements! 
Identity element 
Inverse element 
Congruence relation 
i 
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3.1.2 EXTENDING THE LOCALITY OF ALGEBRAIC STRUCTURES 
SET/CLASS S 
SUB-SG SEMIGRGUP 
SUB-M 
SUB-G 
SEMI-GROUPOID - SUB-SGD 
MONOID REGULAR _ SEMI-GROUPOID 
CLASSICAL 
CELLULAR TESSELATION AUTOMATA 7H. CELLULAR AUTOMATA 
GROUP i SEQUENTIAL PARALLEL MACHINES MACHINES i PARALLEL 
COMPUTATION- 
COROUTINING 
COSETS 
POSETS 
I nd I := operation it is defined V (x, x)ESXS 
SUB-RSGD 
GROUPOID ---- SUB-GD 
FREE 
GD 
CELLULAR 
SPACES 
'7T for some' := operation it is defined for some pairs (x, x)ESXS 
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3.1.3 ON SEMIGROUPOID* (SGD) 
DEF. 1. - A Semigroupoid (SGD) is a set M such that for some pairs 
Ca, a)eM XMa composition aß is defined which satisfies the following 
associative properties: 
AC1. aCßy) is defined iff (aß)y is defined. 
AC2. aay is defined whenever aß and ay are defined. 
The following remark may be considered as raison d'etre for the SGD 
notion and the regular SGD which is introduced below. 
Remark. - We felt the need to introduce and use a mathematical structure 
analogous to monoid algebraic structure, upon which classical Automata 
Theory (CAT) rests. This move is due to the fact that CAT have been 
shown incapable for parallel computation/processing%. We have the 
intuitive feeling that SGD and category theory are quite promising. *** 
Noticeable is also that in a SGD, a relaxation is introduced in the range 
of composition. 
DEF. 2, - Let Ma SGD, acM, ßsM. 
ý is an identity of M iff ýa =a and ßý = ß. 
DEF. 3, - A SGD M is regular (RSGD) iff (V aeM) (3 identities ý, iqeM) 
such that ýa, an are defined. 
PROP. 1. - In a RSGD M for acM 
3 
1ý; 
left identity in M: X(a) and 
'31 right 
identity in M: p(a) such that A(a)a and ap(a) are defined. 
DEF. 4. - Let J(M) - {ýeM/ identity of a RSG 
M} 
sý Details, proofs and examples are found in the appropriate algebraic 
literature. HU, BOURBAKI, MITCHEL; and MELETIS 
(1975)b. 
However we are not dealing with such concepts in the present work. 
A number of works could justify 
it; nam. GOGUEN (1973), (1976) ; 
ARBIB--MAINES (1975)a, b. 
3l stands for 'there exist only one'. 
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C0"- VE Ei (M) =: > 
. 
X(E) _E= pg). 
COL. For J(M) =ý> X(J(M)) = J(M) = p(J(M)). 
LEMMA .-M is RSGD. a, ßeM, 
aß is defined iff p(a) = a(ß). 
LEMMA 2. - M is RSGD, a, ßeM. 
If aß is defined then X(aß) _ A(a), p(aß) = p(ß). 
DEF. 5. - An inverse of acM is a ßeM : aß = A(a) and ßa = p(a). 
DEF. 6. - If acM has an inverse then a is called inversible. 
DEF. 7 .- Let INV(M) -{ý eM/ 
ý inversible }. 
LEMMA 3. - M is RSGD. 
ý%aEINV(M) ýý1 xEM :x= a_1 :_ 'inverse of at. 
PROP. 2. - M is RSGD. 
V ýeJ(M) ;> EeINV(M) i. e. J(M)CINV(M)GM 
Remark. - Generally, a RSGD M has some elements which are not inversible. 
DEF. 8. - A groupoid (GD) is a RSGD in which every element is inversible. 
3.1.4 DEFINITION OF A k-STRUCTURE 
DEF. 1. - A k-structure is a triple K= 
(K, M, I), where K is a class of 
elements called objects of K. M is a class of elements called 
morphisms of K, with the additional structure of regular semigroupoid 
C1ýý ) : K-------- ( RSGD ). I is a function of 
Týýýýýý_ý 
-: May be that 
'identities form a 
n( C-P, 
). M : ýs not a( Gl? D 
). 
on 
J(M) 
:x E--ýi T(x) = ix: ='identity morphism of 
object x' 
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Example. 
Let K= {dl, d2,... d6 
(il: =i etc). 
uý 
U2,..., m8 }, 1 ={il, i2,,, 
SCHEME 1. Representation scheme for a k-structure. 
Remark. - We will sometimes omit identity morphisms for the simpli- 
city of the diagram. Thus, K= (K, M, I) ({6 l, 
62,..., 56}, {11i, u2,..., U8}5 
{il, i2,.., i6}). We say that: (K, M, I) is the implicit (or ? in intenso') 
form, and the r. h. s. is the explicit (or 'in extenso') form, of a 
k-structure. 
DEF, 2. - 11 acM the elements: 
D(a)=x: =Ai (A(c)) and 
l 
R(a)=y: _ý. (p(a)), are called domain and range of morphism 
a, resp. 
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TH. 1. - The product as of two morphisms a, ßeM is defined iff R(a) = D(O) 
Note that: R(a) = DCß) is not always valid for arbitrary SGD. That is 
the raison d'etre of imposing a regular structure on the SG of morphisms 
M. 
Remark 1. - In the above example (scheme 1), ö3, ä4 may be called, accor- 
ding to the current A. I. and cybernetic jargon, terminal objects; 
accordingly, 61 may be designated as kybernetes objects. In simple 
terms, a terminal object is an object from which 
- 
departure (genuine) 
morphism. Diagrammatically 
3.1.5 REMARKS ON k-STRUCTURES 
The following remarks may help for a better understanding and 
effective utilization of k-structure concept. 
1. As far as the semigroupoid component of a k-structure is concerned, 
we have to notice that, the product or composition of any pair of 
morphisms (u1,1L)£MxM, is not always defined. That is, we can not 'go 
through' an object (node in the k-structure's scheme) uniquely. 
2. The main difference between a semigroup (SG) and a semigroupoid 
(SGD) is based on the following fact: the product of a SG is defined 
for every pair of elements while in a SGD is defined for some elements 
only. This relaxation (differentiation) 
illustrates and also embodies 
the superiority and flexibility of a SGD over a graph, say G, which 
represents a relation R, where the product 
is defined for every pair 
of elements of a set S, 
i, e, GER : =SxS. 
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3. An interpretation for a k-structure may be that it represents 
a superposition of a number of relations. 
4. As far as the regular components of a k-structure is concerned, 
we stress that the assumption of 'regularity' was introduced purely 
for 'technical' reasons; it is the means to 'pass through' objects 
(. nodes) in a unique manner, i. e. VU eM -3la 
(u) eM and -9 lp 
(u) eM ; which 
says that for every morphism^ p, there uniquely exists a left and 
right identity morphism such that the products X(p)op and pop(p) are 
well defined. 
5. (S(M)I IKI **-D i. e. the number of identity morphisms is the 
same as the number of objects for a k-structure. This is because 
I: K ---4- J(M) is (1-1) and 'on'. 
6. The conceptualization and motivation for the schematic represent- 
ation is borrowed, in some way, from Graph theory and semantic nets. 
We say, in some way, because the structural assumptions (a k-structure 
is based upon) have different character than those of a (directed 
say) graph. 
3.1.6 WHY AFTER ALL k-STRUCTURES? 
1. To overcome some difficulties which may rise from the use of sets; 
mind that k-structure rests upon the noticn of class. We are not dealing 
with contradictions of the set theory for it is beyond the scope of 
In the case of identity morphism i, we have A(i) 
i = pýiý, 
II denotes the power/cardinality of a set. 
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the present work. However, we are in favour of "Bernays'-Gddel-Von Neuman 
axiomatics"* from a number of available axiomatic set theories. 
2. We may assume that k-structure constitute a powerful kind of non- 
numerical mathematics and, "there is no a priori reason that they are 
inferior to other abstract mathematical structure" for problem-solving, 
for example, as MESAROVIC (1970) points out. 
3. We consider k-structures as variants of semantic nets designed to: 
a. cater for conflict/deadlock/dilemma resolution in parallel-like 
processes**, 
ß" accommodate look-ahead computation** and other heuristics, 
for communication of (intelligent) parallel automata x 
deal with directed nets rather than sequences. 
4. We have the intuitive feeling that category theory, upon which 
k-structures rests, is a promising (recent*** and well established) 
branch of mathematics, which may suggest 'what a comprehensive theory 
of human thinking and intelligence looks like' as well as it may help 
to explain a number of phenomena in human intelligence. 
In addition, to the above, one should see the sections dedicated 
to identity morphisms. Finally, for the usefulness of category 
theory, see GOGUEN (1973), (1976) and ARBIB-MANES (1975)a, (1975)b. 
ý. 
. v. },,, 
. ... s..... 
. ý... .... +.. ". ý... 
DUGUNDJI (1966). 
See "parallel realization of systems" based on category theory 
GOGUEN (1976). 
EILENBLRG-McLANE (1945). 
MITCHIE(1974), KOWALSKI (1975). 
..:.. ". 
:... PETRZ (1965). 
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3.1.7 VIRTUES OF k-STRUCTURES 
k-Structures are some kind of Cybernetic language* for Problem- 
solving and Skeletization processes. k-Structures offer mathematical 
treatment(s) which: 
11 permits precision; 
2, are rigorous; 
3. permits. generality and unification; 
4. allows impossibility and unsatisfiability, eg. undecidability 
to be shown. 
As part of mathematics category theory, which underlies k-struc- 
tures, has all the above properties; we now turn towards the special 
nature of category theory itself. 
5. Category theory arose as a special part of algebra in response 
to the need for a conceptual foundation for certain topics in algebraic 
topology. One way to look at Category theory is as a language of 
structure. 
6. A categorical framework provides a more powerful guide to research 
directions. 
7. Being highly abstract, Cat. th. is well suited to eliminate 
distracting detail from highly structured situations. 
8. The abstractness of categorical formulation often permits one 
to see intriguing similarities between seemingly quite different 
situations. 
The general theory of categories is sufficiently well developed 
to provide rather powerful theorems for use 
in situations which have 
MESAROVIC (1°70), PAPATKONOMOU (1975), GOGUEN (1973), (1976); 
ARBIB--MANES (1975 )a, b. 
? ýý Skelets. zation ;s ur. 4, ly scd. 
in a subsequetit section. 
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been formulated in its language. 
In conclusion, we may say that k-structures could provide a highly 
abstract framework for a General (mathematical) Systems-theory to rest 
upon it. 
3.1.8 ON FUNCTORS* BETWEEN k-STRUCTURES 
Let C= <KC, MC'TC>, D= <KD, MD51D> two k-structures. Let f 
a function F: C ---} D such that :f= (f K5 
fM) , where 
Kc ----) KD 
fM : MC) MD 
i. e. C-objects to D-objects; and 
i. e. C-morphisms to D-morphisms. 
DEF. 1. -f: C ---> D is a (covariant) functor from C to D iff 
CF1 : If a: X --ý Y then f(a) : f(X) --} f(Y). 
CF2 :f (iX) = 1f(X) " 
CF3 : if aß is defined then f (aß) = f(a) f(8). 
3.1.9 ON NATURAL TRANSFORMATIONS' OF FUNCTORS 
Let f, g: C ---} D two functors, from C to D. 
DEF. 2. - By a natural transformation of functor f into the functor g, we 
mean a function (D which assigns to each C-object a D-morphism `, i. e. 
MD 4ý KC ---* 
XH (X ) KD --ý KD , such that 
ýº Details, examples and interpretations are given in MELEi'IS (1975)b. 
One may interpret objects (morphisms) as performances 
(linkages) 
respectively, which are mentioned 
in sect. 2.2.2. 
(NT 1) tJXE Kc =: e (X) : f(X) ---. > g(X) . 
(NT 2) d aEMC => e(X) f(a) = g(a)ý(X)ý 
i. e., the following diagram is commutative: 
f(a) 
f(X) 
ID(x) 
g(X) 
0. f(Y 
ý(Y) 
g(Y) 
g(a) 
3.1.10 A POSSIBLE CRITICISM* ON k-THEORY/k-STRUCTURES 
One could naturally make some criticisms on k-structures, for 
example, if objects and morphisms may represent almost anything, then 
k-theory does say to us noting at all. Thus, in order for k-theory to 
pass beyond the realm of metaphor to that of hypothesis, it has to tell 
us, at least, about three issues: 
A. What sets of possible objects and morphisms are? 
B. What sort of thing transformations among k-structures are ? 
C. What is it that underlies all the areas the theory tries to 
unify? 
Hints to answer the above questions may be found in the following 
sections, respectively: 
At, 'On objects and morphisms of a k--structure'. 
BI, tOn dts anatomy' and 'on functors and natural transformations', 
Similar criticisms are made in DR. ESHER-HO . ü; STEIýý 
(1976) on ': insky's 
quite influential to A, , community frames theory. 
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Ci. 
Cl. 
These are various aspects and modes of analogical thinking which 
are employed or exhibited by humans/machines. 
The shifting of representations in learning and problem-solving 
activities. 
3,1.1-1 ON OBJECTS AND MORPHISMS OF A k-STRUCTURE 
Objects of a k-structure may represent a number of things; nam. 
set, class, function, relation, topic, theory, predicate, proposition, 
word, clause, event, state, scene, situation and so on. Also it may 
represent some abstract mathematical system/structure; nam. algebraic: 
that is, group, module, k-structure (! ), etc; and topological: that is 
space, etc. Finally, it may represent a concept; eg. physical 
objects, qualities, predicates, ways of doing things, moments or inter- 
vals of time, locations, distances, numbers, processes, actions, beliefs 
and so on. 
Objects and morphisms are classified as follows: 
Object types: 
01. According to the number of (radiated and/or satellite)' morphisms 
as: isolated, terminal, kybernetes, ordinary/typical. 
02: According to point of view as: global, local. 
03. According to topology as: radiated, satellite, centre. 
Morphismýý 41. types: 
Ml. According to directionality as: ingoing, outgoing, biderectional, 
Notions which are fully analysed in a subsequent section, 
Sometimes Identity morphisms of objects are omitted to make 
diagrams clear., 
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non-directed, 
M2. According to point of view or semasiology as: identity, ordinary, 
global, local, functional. 
3.1 12 ON IDENTITY MORPHISMS 
In the present section, we elaborate, as far as space permits, on 
nature, role, importance, raison d'etre and usefulness of identity morph- 
isms of k-structures. 
The nature of identity morphisms comes straight forward from the 
definition of a k-structure and it may be summarized as follows: 
Let C= (K, M, T) a k-structure, where the function 
I: K 
(1-1) 
y J(M)CM 
maps :X1>I (X) = ix :_ "identity morphisms of object X" 
We remind the reader that, 
J(M) ={1 cm/ix : identity morphism of object X, V XcK }. 
As it is stressed in many places throughout the work, morphisms 
and particularly the identity ones, play the most important role in 
understanding, specification and manipulation of a k-structure. We 
are able to see the above made point, in a particular case, that of 
an organism for example, where relations between subparts of the 
organism underlay its behaviour; or in the case of an economic organi- 
sation or an automation and so on. Objects thus, have some sort of 
secondary role. This is indeed so, for objects can uniquely be 
determined via the inverse Irl of the identity function I; nam. 
l" ; J(M) --T 
^1 . 
x X} 
X. = "object of k-structure" , i 
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Note that the inverse T^' does exist and is well defined due to the fact 
that function I: K ---; J(M)CM is (1-1) and on. 
On the raison dfftre of identity morphisms. Identity morphisms of 
objects of a k-structure are introduced for the following reasons: 
1. The 'well definedness' in a mathematical sense of the 'morphism 
component' (i, e. function fM) of a functor f= (K'M) , which we claim 
models an analogy between two k'-structures (Universes of Discourse or 
Conceptual Universes) 
f: C --ýý D 
" Kc -ý - _D 
:X ý----} fK (X) 
: MC ---ý MD 
: 11 ý---ý fm Cu) 
2. To give sense to an 'endomorphism' betwen a k-structure and itself, 
i. e. when C-D. In this case f: C}C. This endo-morphism is 
ellaborated in what we call elsewhere (sect. 2.2.3), inter-structure 
communication, illustrated via shifting-1. 
3. For the sake of establishing an 'homomorphism' between k-structures. 
In fact, D's identity morphisms may serve as fM-images for C's genuine 
morphisms between non-isolated D's objects. See VOREADOU (1977), 
BERTZISS (1973). 
4. Identity morphisms permit (by virtue of their SGD structure) 
'passage via an object' in a 'unique manner' such that the synthesis 
of morphisms makes sense. 
5. Finally, during the course of comparisons (sect. 3.4,3) in 
skeletization, conflicts may occur; see sect. 3.4, In cases where 
syntactic or geometric comparisons, carried out for similarity reasons, 
lead to undecidability or deadlocks, then the objects' additional 
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qualitative characteristics come Into effect*, Some of those qualities 
are embodied within identity morphisms. 
When we talk in k-space terms, via k-opens defined in a subsequent 
section, then the matrix %ý element X(1,1), which could represent the 
identity ix may be supplied with appropriate information to represent 
those object's XcK qualities, distributed among X's adjacent or 
radiated objects; this is, in fact, a sort of local definition of ix, 
nam. those objects attached to X relevant to its context. 
Furthermore, any matrix element X(j, j): = ix 
i, 
jýl, represents 
'the relative contribution, from qualitive viewpoint, of Xj radiated 
object, to the X's quality', or X(j, j) could be interpreted as "the 
degree of 1xJ , 
's membership to ix" or "fuzzy value" in ZADEH's (1973) 
terms; also as 'Local Identity Morphism Emphasis' (LIME) (see Appendix) 
or "Identity Colour" in STEPHANTSIEKMAN (1976) terms. The above may be 
considered as a terminology and a set of concepts for a departure 
into computational issues on k-structures. 
3.1.13 SUMMARY 
In the preceding section, we picked up a well known locality of 
algebraic structure, i. e. Semigroup-Monoid-Group, and we extended it 
into that of semigroupoid-Regular Semigroupoid-Groupoid by giving 
briefly basic definitions. Built upon this, as mathematical 
ýý This is made clear in the section 'on conflict resolution'. 
A sort of matrix representation of a k-structure and k'-open 
is assumed. More in the Appendix. 
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background, the notion of k-structures has been introduced. A few 
reasons for their introduction were given, followed by some of their 
vitues, The next important* issue is that of a functor between 
k-'structures and of natural transformations between functors. To avoid 
a reasonable criticism on k-structures, a clear classification of 
objects and morphisms, basic ingredients of a k-structure, is made. 
Finally, we focus on identity morphisms, a theme which features a k-struc- 
ture. 
k-STRUCTURE 
3.2 ON k-SPACES 
3.2.0. GENERALITIES 
OBJECT 
MORPHISMS 
IDENTITY MAP 
As it will be made clear, later on in this chapter, the notion 
of shifting of representations during analogizing intellectual activi- 
of analogies conceived as trans- ties. 'ýý is conceived as a sequence*" 44. 
formations or correspondances between skeletons of the previously 
introduced k-structures. : Special emphasis, therefore, should first be 
given to skeletons of k-structures which is the result of skeletization 
or skeleton formation process. Skeletization is based on what we call 
For skeletons and shifts of representations. 
... 
, g, Analogical problemýsolving or 
learning, 
na generalized sense, as it is exemplified later on. 
** ' 
Rather a net i 
84. 
k-spaces, an important issue in our methodology. Next, k-spaces are 
informally introduced. 
3.2.1 INFORMAL INTRODUCTION TO k-SPACES 
Our ultimate aim, before skeletization should take place, is to 
supply a k-structure with some kind of organization* so that effective 
utilization of k-structure's ingredients could be achieved. To this 
I 
respect, the organization we supply amounts to the 'separation of the 
context of a concept" from the concept itself' technique. This 
methodology naturally leads to some family or collection of objects and 
their neighbouring morphisms. We call such a family a k-space correspond- 
ing to a k-structure. We now present a somewhat formal introduction to 
k-spaces. Most of the terminology which follows is borrowed from 
topology and to a mathematician the process should remind him of a 
kind of 'topologizing a set'. We start from the notion of a k-open and 
k-spaces. 
ol 
3.2.2 ON k-SPACES and k-OPENS 
The basic and most fundamental ingredient of a k-'space is what 
we call k-open. Let a k-structure K= (K, M, I) be the one we used in 
:1 Sometimes we refer to it as a 'topology'; by this term we do not 
mean it in the strict mathematical sense. 
That is the case when objects of a k-structure are concepts. 
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a previous section; nam. K= {RI, R2,... n}, M ={ ml, m2,.., mm}, 
I= {iV i22'**2'n} be its objects, morphisms and identity morphisms 
resp. In diagrammatic terms (n = 6, m= 8) we have the schema 1 shown 
below. 
ýý 
sm3 
A morphology for a k-open: (Sl, S2, S3) 
Sl : Centre Object X 
S2 : Radiated Morphisms and Objects 
S3 : Satellite Morphisms 
SCHEMA 1 
SCHEMA 2 
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3.2.2.1 Definition of a k--offen 
A k-open corresponding to an object XeK is defined by a triple 
(S15S21S3) where; 
S1 is the k-open's Centre or kernel object X, 
S2 is the tuple (RO, RM) of Radiated arranged Objects and Morphisms 
(ingoing-outgoing) which are attached (connected) to the centre 
object, 
S3 is the set SM of Satellite Morphisms which link some of the radiated 
objects. 
A possible morphology for a k-open is sketched in schema 2. Notice 
that in the subsequent diagrams and schemas of this chapter, we omit 
sometimes the identity morphis,, s - the illustrations thus becoming 
rather more clear. 
3,2.2.2 Definition of a k-space 
A k-space, for a given k-structure K, is a collection of k-opens. 
Examples of k-structure, k-space, k-opens and other notions we refer 
to in the present section are clearly elaborated in a case study which 
follows and which treats WINSTON's (1970) Relational Structures from 
a fresh viewpoint. In the remainder of this section, we examine in 
detail the concept of a k-open and we start with a few remarks on 
the triple's (Sl, S2'S3) components. 
Remarks. - We are now considering some special cases for the members 
of the triple (Sl, S2, S3), such that some meaning may be assigned to 
the classification schemes we describe in an earlier section entitled 
tOn objects and morphisms of a k-'structure'. In fact, the following 
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conditions constitute definitions or criteria for the names given to 
objects and morphisms in that section. 
2 
If RO = 0, then the centre object X is characterized as isolated. 
If the direction of a radiated morphism m is towards the centre 
object X, then it is called ingoing. 
3. If the direction of a radiated morphism m is forward from the 
centre object X, then the name outgoing morphism is assigned to it. 
4. If the set of ingoing Radiated Morphisms is empty, i. e. IRM = 0, 
then object X is named as kybernetes object. 
5. If the set of outgoing Radiated MorphismsWis empty, i. e. 
ORM = 0, then object X is called terminal object. 
3.2.3 k-OPEN's ANALYSIS 
A k-open may be analysed from a number of different points of 
view. We rather choose a picturesque one, shown in schema 3, to 
emphasize its semasiology and topology. In this context, the repre- 
sentation which is given in that schema reflects two views; nam. a 
morphism-oriented view and a topological-oriented view. 
We next analyse what we mean by Tl, T2, T3 shown in schema 3: 
Topos Ti : centre object's adjacent objects (syntax) 
Topos T2 : centre object's context, expressed mainly via its adjacent 
morphisms (semantics) 
Topos T3 : centre object's environmental influence (pragmatics or 
behaviour area). 
To this respect, Topos 3 could also include 'dangling' morphisms 
emanating from ROs. 
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We may thus introduce the following three notions: 
T1'-open; eg, (X; RO1, R02, ..., R07) 
T2-open; eg, (X; ml, m2ý 0.. 3 M7) 
T3-open; eg. (X; sm1, sm2, ..., sm4) 
Schema 3 
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3.2.5 SUMMARY 
In the preceding section we introduced the notion of a k-space for 
a given k-structure, as a collection of k-opens. The latter's feature 
is a triple which captures the (topologically) neighbouring objects and 
morphisms, as well as what we call satellite morphisms; namely the 
morphisms linking the radiated objects in respect to the central one, X. 
An analysis also is given which emphasizes the topological features of 
a k-open. The section ends with a look at a k-Open from a number of 
standpoints; nam. morphism-oriented and topological-oriented, In dia- 
grammatic terms we have: 
k-SPACE 
OBJECTS 
k-OPENS 
CENTRE OBJECT 
RADIATED 
OBJECTS 
MORPHISM 
INGOING 
OUTGOING 
SATELITE MORPHISMS 
IDENTITY MORPHISMS 
3.3 AN EXAMPLE - CASE STUDY 1 
3.3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Before proceeding further in developing other parts of our theory 
and methodology in order to tackle questions andproblers put forward 
>; To a centre object X which characterizes the k-open in question. 
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in the previous chapter, we reformulate in this section, WINSTON's 
C1970), Relational Structures, with the aim of illustrating concepts 
which we introduced so far. His case studies, on learning and analogi- 
cal problem solving'{, played an important role in our conceptualizations 
and had much infouence on the present investigations; se also WINSTON 
(1975), (1977). 
3.3.1 WINSTON's RELATIONAL STRUCTURES 
Winston's system was briefly outlined in section 1.1.6. Its 
salient features relevant to our investigations have been mentioned 
there. Now we present a, relatively speaking, complex scene; its 
representation via k-structures is sketched and k-spaces corresponding 
to them are presented in diagrams. The latter are produced via the, 
so-called, 'separating the context of a concept from the concept itself' 
technique for which a formal account is given. Details of computer 
implementation are given in the Appendix; nam, the construction of 
k-spaces for WINSTON's examples is achieved via KOSMOS subroutine. 
Hypotheses-Assumptions: 
1. Kl, K2 structures involve: global objects, i. e. bL, wL, bR' wR 
global morphisms, 
i. e. P, S, H, K. 
local objects, i. e. 
2. No local-ordinary object may be repeated in a given k-structure. 
3. Local objects of MODELS, K1 or K2 are disjoint from local objects 
of all other k-structures. 
J 
.. 
.. '. 
apres EVANS (1963). 
UpperscrIpts L, R indicate LEFT, RIGHT structure resp. 
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4. Morphisms of MODELS are disjoint from those of K1 or K2. 
5. Indefinite objects b and w are given some computer representations. 
6. Models for indefinite objects b and w are not identical. 
7. A k-structure has only a finite number of objects and morphisms 
Cso^called 'small k-structure'). 
8. We refer to 'objects' as 'CONCEPT-names labelling nodes' and to 
'morphisms' as 'ARC-names labelling links between concept names'. 
9. Kl or KOSMOS 1 or LEFT are various names given to the same k- 
structure; likewise, for K2 or KOSMOS 2 or RIGHT. 
10. A context of an object X is considered as the k-open corresponding 
to it in the sense of sect. 3.2. 
Schema 1 may also be considered as an analogy-type problematic 
thesis 0, in the sense of notions developed in Ch. 2. Scheme 2 gives 
their representations in k-structure terms; where 
OBJECTS MORPHISMS 
1; left object P: 'part is' 
r: right object S: 'supports' 
b: block K: 'kind of 
w: wedge H: 'same height' 
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LEFT SCENE RIGHT SCENE 
Schema 1. Winston's Scenes 
LEFT STRUCTURE Kl RIGHT STRUCTURE K2 
Schema 2, k-Structure representation 
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3.3.2 DEFINITION OF n, e MAPS 
The basic idea in the construction of a k-space is to convert' LEFT, 
RIGHT, and MODELS into a single Conceptual Universe with homogeneous 
constituents, i. e. k-OPENS. 
STEP-1: Define a map it as follows : 
'For every object x, local or global, in LEFT, RIGHT and MODELS create 
a new (topological) object Tr(x)cTX -%º i. e. 
LL if LEFT =L= {l, c, d, f, h, i, g, j , w, ,b} 
RIGHT =R= {r, m, n, p, s, q, t, wR, bR} 
MODELS= M= {w, b} 
X= LURUM 
then it :X ---wTX 
:x i---'WTT (x )= 1rx :=k: -open for x 
Let TX = Tr(L)U, i(R)UTr(M), 
where ff(L) _ {Tr(1), 7(c),...; r(wý, Tr(bý} 
Tr(R) _ {Tr(r), Tr(m),..., Tr(w), Tr(w)} 
, ff (M) _ {7r(w), 7T(b)}, then 
STEP 2: Define -a map F -from TX into contexts as 
follows::. '' 
For every global/ordinary object g, set: E(Tr(g)): = 'CONTEXT or g' 
i. e. e: T1 
TX 
C -----ro, 
Global 
7Tg E( 1Tgý C7r ._... , 
g 
Global 
{ TrwL' TrbL' ýwR'7bR }U{ ffw' 7Tll }`. 
The net effect of this conversion might be though of, somehow 
as a manner of 1topologizing X1 , LUGUNDJ. [ 
(1966) 7 p, 65, 
In TX the superscript, nam. 1, signifies some kind of the so-called 
'Level'-1 environment' in some sense similar to the one 
KOWALSKI (1975) uses, 
i', '* Conto t in the intuitive sense of the term. 
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Fox, every 1oca1/oxdýnary object, set; 
. 
3,. e. 
CTTl c CONTEXT of 1F 
e: T1 
I 
--ý C X( local- 
: If 
1 F--ý--s" c( Trl )- C "- Tr 1" 
I*I 
3.3.3 USING THE SYNTHESIS coTr TO SEPARATE THE CONTEXT OF A CONCEPT 
FROM THE CONCEPT ITSELF 
STEP-3: Thus the composition cow :X)C maps to every object, be 
it local. or global, its context; i. e. 
The pragmatics of this process is that it provides with a practical 
distinction: 'Synthesis eon separates the context of a concept (object) 
from the concept itself'. 
3.3.3.1 Ralson d'etre for Eon and prolegomena to skeletization 
The existence of eoT is due to the fact that the 'pseudo-semiotic' 
or 'contextual' similarity, we are going to establish, is about contexts 
of the concepts involved. Skeleton formation process (sect. 3,4) is 
mainly based on pairing off LEFT's objects to RTGHT's objects, on the 
basis of similar contexts. Such pairing off yield pairs of similar 
5 ). ýr oýs im i 1ar ; ty r, elatio? 1s , etc, see ZADEH (19- i 1)b and DrRN 
'1 (197 
MPLES OF k-SPACES 
95. 
9ý. 
y 
-',, Schema 2: K2 - -S-PACE 
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(equivalent) objects, which amounts to the formation of equivalent 
classes of objects, SKELALG's computer programme, see Appendix, carried 
on until some kind of 'maximal pairing' is synthesized, The skeletiza- 
tý, on universe4ý then is constructed as 'quotient k'structure', consisting 
of similar classes of objects (invisible or tacit objects) equipped with 
their morphisms (those remain after suitable morphism and object elimina- 
tions). The skeleton, which might be formed, represents (schema 
section 3.4.6,2) some sort of common structure shared by the parent 
structures, LEFT and RIGHT. 
3.4 ON SKELETIZATION 
3.4.0 INTRODUCTION 
We now focus our attention on the notion of skeleton and its 
synthesis amounting to a skeleton formation process, from now on called 
skeletization and symbolized as SFP. Skeletons play important role 
on the issue of shifting between representations, as it soon becomes 
clear from illustrative examples (3.5.10). Skeletons may be conceived 
as amalgams of k-structures. From a mathematical point of view, 
skeletons are 'quotientý-k-structures'. On the other hand, SFP, main 
theme of the present work, is elaborated in an algebraic-topological 
manner; key notions for it are: k-structures, k-spaces, k-opens, and 
concepts that are going to be developed, as for example, morphism 
emphasis, set adjacency measures, morphism/object elimination and so on. 
'c PASK (1975)a. 
The notion of quotient is elaborated in WONG (1974), GOGUEN (1976), 
DUGUNDJI(1966), ARBIB-MANES (1975)b. 
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3.4.1 INTERPRETING SKELETON 
Let us start by giving a number of intuitive interpretations of 
the notion of a skeleton in its broad sense. The following viewpoints 
might offer some idea about a skeleton, and perhaps its role in 
analogical reasoning, in the way we conceive it However, these stand- 
points represent mere speculations and it might be possible that they 
reflect partial views on the matter under question. Thus a skeleton 
may be considered in: 
Algebra as a structure commonly shared by the parent structures; HU 
(1965), BOURBAKI (1951). 
Artificial Intelligence and cognition as a sort of abstraction or the 
result of generalization; MELTZER (1970)a and (1973), LEFAIVRE 
(1974), WINSTON (1970). 
The theory of k-structures (k-theory) as a sub-k-structure; in fact, 
quotient k-structure. 
Finally, in Problem-Solving as a representation of (abstractions of) 
problematic situations (theses). 
Generally speaking, one may think of a skeleton as 'quotient' in 
the algebraic sense of the term. That is, a set consistent of equiv- 
alent classes; where an equivalent class is made up from similar ele- 
ments in respect to an equivalence relation. 
Let us mention a few names which we think are appropriate to label 
our notion of skeleton and SFP; nam. 
Which is slightly different from that which one can find in an 
English dictionary. 
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K1, K2 quotient generator; BARNDEN (1975). 
Equivalence detector; PAVEL (1976), MYLOPOULOS-TOURLAKIS (1973). 
Functor constructor; GOGUEN (1970). 
Abstractor; MELTZER (1973). 
Carrier of a reconciliation 
level) analogizes. 
3.4.2 SKELETON FORMATION 
for Kl, K2 structures, or Trivial (low 
We now turn into the skeleton formation process (SFP) or skeleti- 
zation. In order to skeletize two given k-structures, say K1 and K2, 
we are going to link together or compare their k-spaces. In fact, this 
process of bringing k-spaces together is achieved, somehow, in algebraic- 
topological manner. SFP has been implemented in a computer programme 
called SKELALG (for SKELeton ALGorithm); details are given in the 
Appendix. An outline of SFP follows. 
SKELALG receives two k-structures Kl, K2 as input and stores them 
in an internal form (matrix one). It then produces (generates) some 
sort of topological partitions for K1, K2 structures, via the 'separa- 
ting the context of a concept from the concept itself' technique; sect. 
3.3.3. The partitions are what we called in section 3.2 k-spaces, and 
their basic ingredients are the k-opens. This step is the job of KOSMOS 
sub-routine which is outlined in the Appendix. 
SKELALG works mainly upon k-opens. That is why special emphasis 
has been given to the key notion of a k-open, detailled analysis for it 
has been made from a number of standpoints, examples are given and 
SLANGLE (1968). 
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various interpretations are assinged to it; section 3.2. 
Skeleton formation then proceeds as follows: a number of 
computations are carried out among the k-opens, components of the so- 
formed k-spaces. 
One analogy we can think of, at the moment, to illustrate the 
situation up to now, is the following: imagine a pool, the skeleti- 
zation universe, and the objects (concepts) of Kl, K2 structures, in 
addition to the k-opens (contexts) of kl, k2 spaces, floating around. * 
Notice that k-opens (i. e. the objects' contexts) are separated (liberali- 
zed) from the objects themselves. 
SKELALG's main task now is to compare k-spaces. It is worthwhile 
here to point out that a shift has been tacitly made for the comparison; 
nam. the latter is carried out among k-opens, i. e. the constituents 
of k-spaces, and not between objects, i. e. the ingredients of k-struc- 
tures. This is, in fact, a very important aspect for the entire skele- 
tization process. During the comparison, a variety of resemblance 
measures are used in order to match k-oepns and group them into equiv- 
alent classes made up of similar elements. Notice that, initially, the 
job of k-structures' comparator partially depends on some sort of 
a priori hint concerning a kind of (external to k-spaces) similarity 
between the two k-structures involved in the skeletization. In the 
examples, we are using to illustrate SFP, the above mentioned hint 
becomes: 
LEFT ARCH = RIGHT ARCH, sect. 3.4.7, and LEFT SCENE RIGHT SCENE, 
Sect. 3.3. 
The models for Kl, K, structures are also included, 
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3.4.3 k-SPACES COMPARISON 
It is the core of skeletization (SFP). It has been implemented 
via the KRISIS subroutine, the flavour of which is given below. 
Details of its implementation and mathematical forms used in its sub- 
parts are given in the Appendix. What follows is referred to the 
k-structures and k-spaces analysed and sketched in sect. 3.3. 
Having K1, K2 spaces' construction been made, via KOSMOS sub- 
routine, the comparison stage between k-spaces' constituents, i. e. 
k-opens, takes place via the KRISIS subroutine, the main procedure of 
SKELALG computer programme, which, as we mentioned earlier, implements 
skeleton formation, 
Comparison of Kl, K2 spaces leads inevitably to dilemmas'-, con- 
flicts**, or deadlocks*%u*, i. e. situations where it is difficult for 
the decision-maker or problem-solver, in this case programme SKELALG 
to decide effectively between two directions of action or opinion which 
are (for it) computationally equal. Elaborating at this point, we may 
Il I\ 
say that SKELALG, after some successful* ' inferences based on structu- 
rally similar pairs of k-opens (contexts) been made, and after 
carrying them (relations A and B) over to the skeletization universe, 
it arrives at the following set of similarity relations which are listed 
below: 
Cl=Cr ==> C C C n 
Cý=Cn ==; >' Ch=Ct 
11 Cý = Cm (A) 
Cf = Cq (B) 
RYLE (1949); 
COLES (1975), (1977), LEFEBVRE (1967), SACERDOTI (1975) D. 11. 
PETRI (1965) , TSIPIS 
(1977). 
i, e. Where no confl. ý. ct/dilemma, in the sense we put 
it, arises. 
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The above relations are produced by taking into account: 
(a) the structure of Kl, K2 spaces, and 
(b) computations which are carried out via a number of subroutines; 
nam. BIV, NORMA, MARV, EMARV, LFUZZIF, GFUZZIF and so on, 
which are outlined in the Appendix. 
Notice that initially the hint 'KOSMOS 1 or structure K1 is similar 
to KOSMOS 2 or structure K2' is supplied. 
SKELALG then carries on yielding the following: 
{ c Q 
C) 
=CC. =C or CC} , 
{C. =C or C. =C}, mipiSJpJS 
w Cý or Cg= C} 
s 
(D) 
At this point, computer programme SKELALG is deadlocked due to 
the fact that 'distances' between pairs of k-opens are equal, leaving 
thus SKELALG with no option and therefore unable to dec ide effectively, 
i, e, to take an appropriate action%ý. The situation which actually 
arises is as follows: 
ISOL2 (Cl, CP) = ISOL2 (Ci, Cs) 
ZSOL2 (Cj , CP) = ISOL2 
(Cj , CS) 
ISOL2 (Cg, CP) = ISOL2 (Cg, Cs) 
where, ISOL2 is some kind of distance measure between two contexts 
(k-opens) Cn, Cy; details in the Appendix. 
?. 
In fact, what problem-solving generally amounts to is: t'power 
for an appropriate selection"; AMAREL 
(1967), ASHBY (1956), 
MELTZER (1970)b. 
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3.4.4 TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ADVISORS 
3.4.4.0 Introduction 
The deadlock thus produced, preventing SFP from any other action, 
is perhaps because only structural features of k-opens have been taken 
into consideration. At this moment, when 'structural experts' partially 
fail, special advisors are called into action. That is, SKELALG 
provides, in cases of undecidability and when dilemmas occur, a set of 
alternative courses of action controlled by what we call strategic 
and tactical advisors. These are some of its, allow me to say, 
intelligent features, which make skeletization, implemented via SKELALG 
(and thus analogical problem-solving via HARMONY**") partially superiorn-. " 
and to some extent a bit more powerful, computationally, than parts of 
EVANS'(1963) and WINSTON's (1970) implementations. We are next going 
to have a closer look on issues concerning the above mentioned advisors. 
3.4.4.1 Tactical Advisor 
Tactical Advisor deals with or is devoted to 'local' structural 
changes; one of its aims is to bring about a similarity"'via 
morphism/object elimination*'*. That is, it discovers, somehow, that a 
disturbance factor for the contextual similarity, is morphism H in 
the presence case and it takes the Tactical Action (TA): 'eliminate 
morph-ism HI from k-opens (contexts) Cl. C. j 
and Cg. 
Compare them with the so-called "critics" used by SUSSLý, d (1975); 
SACERDOTI (1975); and LENAT (1977). 
%1. Computer programme to be investigated in the foreseable future. 
*** As far as the theory underlying their models is concerned. 
A, somehow, 'pseudo-semiotic' one, see sect. 3.5.1.1. 
-1_imination is e1, ýborated in sect. ". 4.6. 
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The above used expression 'local' refers to the attributes of the 
k^spaces involved in the skeletization process. Thus a TA directly 
affects k-spaces' constituents. 
Part of a tactical advisor's task is the analysis and diagnosis 
of the reasons which cause a deadlock. Thus a tactical advisor is 
also acting as a diagnostician, so to speak. The discovery of the dis- 
turbance factor may be detected in a manner which is fully exemplified 
in section 3.4.6. 
The net effect of a tactical advisor, in the general case, may be 
Summarized in a threefold manner; nam. 
a. morphism-elimination of an appropriate set of morphisms, from 
an appropriate set of k-opens, directly relevant and involved 
in a conflict; 
b. reconstruct the appropriate k-opens; thus producing a new k- 
space; and 
ct reapply subroutine KRISIS to resolve conflict. 
3,4,4,2 Strategic Advisor. 
One of the results of our investigations, via SKELALG computer 
programme, was that unfortunately the above tactical advisor only 
partially resolves the occurred dispute in an interaction between 
kr-structures. Thus, skeleton formation process needs something add- 
itional. Therefore, SKELALG calls into action its strategic advisors 
It takes over and hints to a number of 'Strategic' so to speak, 
Advices `% (SA) , which may 
be described as follows: 
Compare it with MacARTHY's (1959) advice taker. 
Relate them with SACERDOTI's (1975) p. 11 "general-purpose critics". 
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SAil. eliminate morphism H from kl-structure (ME)* 
SA12, reconstruct k1-structure 
SA13. recompute k1-space via KOSMOS subroutine 
SA14, refuzzify kl-space via GFUZZIF and LFUZZIF 
SA15. reapply KRISIS to resolve conflict 
Strategic Advisor, thus, is dealing with some sort of 'global' 
structural changes in contrast to tactical advisor. That is, strategic 
advisor affects a k-structure and therefore a k-space. 
Another set of strategic advices might be the following one: 
SA21, object-elimination (OE) 
SA22, reconstruction of a k-structure 
SA23, recomputation of its k-space 
SA24, refuzzification of k-spaces' constituents 
SA25 reapplication of endo-krisis to resolve an 'internal conflict. 
Notice that in SA25 a variant of KRISIS subroutine is used; namely when 
k1-structure is equal to k2-structure. This case of skeletization is 
linked to inter-shifts (or shifting-1) mentioned in section 2.1.3.; 
that is, their communication is carried out between a k-structure and 
itself. The case, though trivial, is interesting as soon will be made 
clear, 
3,4,5 APRES TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ADVISORS - DISCUSSION 
From the above stated sets of advices a problem naturally arises. 
Namely, which sort of action should be taken when conflicts arise? 
ME stands for morphism-elimination. 
106. 
However, which kind or mode of elimination is going to be taken, i. e. 
morphism. -elimination (ME) or object-elimination (OE), is a matter of 
question open to discussion, and one of the aims of SKELALG is to 
provide 'freedom of opinion' to that respect. That is, it is left 
open to it in order to decide, at any particular case, according to 
the current view that is held about the situation. This is, somehow, 
elaborated in what follows next and is taken up again in a subsequent 
section (3.5.1) entitled 'on morphism and object elimination'. 
Strategic/tactical advisors, thus skeletization* SFP, may be 
supplied with a variety of means to provide the capability of looking 
from different points of view a deadlock/dilemma/conflict situation. 
Thus, dilemma resolution may effectively be achieved by considering 
a situation (k-structure) via various definitions of morphism-emphasis, 
qualitative features of a k-open; see Appendix for different 
morphism-emphases. To this respect, a number of alternative sub- 
routines are available. The repertoire consisting from : RMARVA, 
ARIADNI, THESEUS, CANTOR and so on. 
The net effect of the intervening strategic and tactical advi- 
sors, as well as the foregoing 'changing the viewpoint to a situation', 
amount in fact to a change in the stylistics of KRISIS subroutine's 
structure, through shich SKELALG programme carries out k-structure, 
k-space comparisons and handles conflicts and dilemmas. This change 
provides some sort of flexibility in the KRISIS's 
behaviour, 
We have to bear in mind that a strategic advisor is called upon 
to supply action by KRISIS 
(or rather invoked) if and only if: 
* Hence analogical problem-solving. 
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A. a dilemma/conflict has occurred; and 
B. a set of morphisms or objects for elimination has to be 
selected, 
We wish to go deeper in the above issue by closing the present 
section with a final remak that sometimes 'a synergy or combination 
of Strategic and Tactical Advices (SAT)' should be taken. We think 
that this combination is the most effective response to resolve a 
dilemma situation in k-structure communication; i. e. maintaining 
a global and/or local consideration and simultaneously changing the 
viewpoints of the situation. Strategic-tactical synthesis illustrates 
and embodies the dialectic mode of a system, let us call it HARMONY, 
which may be proved achievable in the foreseable future, and which 
would implement the harmonization (sect. 3.5.5) of k-structures, a 
process or methodology so useful to analogical problem-solving and 
learning, Next, the rather controversial issue of object/morphism 
elimination is taken into account. 
3,4.6 ON MORPHISM AND OBJECT ELIMINATION 
3.4.6.0 Introduction 
We must now consider a very important issue, mentioned earlier, 
and which is summarized in the following sentence - there is some 
kind of freedom of choice supplied to the skeletization process, in 
order to resolve a conflict /dilemma during the course of 
k-structure 
comparison; it is achieved by changing the viewpoint of a situation, 
and by looking to the k-spaces' constituants from 
different emphases. 
At this point a number of questions naturally arise; nam. 
How does SKELALG notice that a conflict in k-space communication 
occurs? 
2. How does it discover the disturbance factor? 
3. How does it infer which sort of elimination has to be applied? 
In what follows we attempt to give some answers to these questions 
by describing or interpreting a number of results received during the 
implementation of skeleton formation process (SFP) via SKELALG computer 
programme which has been partially analyses throughout the sections of 
the present chapter and for which details are given in the Appendix. 
3.4.6,1. Morphsism Elimination 
In section 3.4.3 we end up with a number of relations; nam. 
(A), (B), (D). The members of these relations are the components of 
k-spaces fully detailled in section 3.3.4. A first suggestion for 
a conflict is the difference in the numbers of radiated objects of 
the two k-opens under comparison, nam. d, m. In the present situation, 
i. e. relation (D), this difference can be easily traced via: 
LK10Pd ý LK10Pm 
where LK10Px : =the number of radiated objects, adjacent to the central 
one, i. e. x, or, from schema in sect. 3.2.3, we have: 
TOPOS1d ý TOPOS1 
SKELALG thus notices from the beginning that a disturbing factors 
During the course of the attempt to establish a similarity between 
k-spaces. 
in the k-space dialogue does exist. Therefore, it activates its 
! diagnosticians', which are parts of tactical and strategic advisors 
CTA) and (SA) we described in a previous section, towards the task of 
eliminating the disturbing factor. The latter, amounts to what we 
called object or morphism elimination, (OE) or (ME) resp. Now, 
how does tactical advisor TA work towards it? 
First, TA considers from a topological point of view, the con- 
flict causing k-opens, i. e. (Cj, Cj, Cg), appeared in relation (D) 
section 3.4.3, TA discovers that: 
1ý Morphism H appears in Ci, C., Cg and not in Cs, Cp; this is 
achieved through scanning over the TOPOS2 area of Ci, Cj5C9, CS, CP. 
This event suggests that there is a difference in the number of 
morphisms; more precisely: 
LK20P ý LK20P or TOPOS2 ý TOPOS2 
xyxy 
and therefore, a conflict might be caused due to morphism H. Thus, 
morphism-elimination is a possibility, at the present moment, to rem- 
edy the deadlock that skeletization arrives at. 
2. Morphism H belongs to TOPOS2 (definition area, sect. 3.2.3), 
for C., C,; also H lies in TOPOS3 (behaviour area, sect. 3.2.3) for Cg. 
Second, if TA eliminates morphism H from C±, Cj, Cg, locally (i. e. 
within k-space), then we found that dilemma occurs again. That is 
the situation which arises is similar to the one we had in sect. 3.4.3 
where; ISOL2(.,. ) = ISOL2 (.,. ). So, it seems that morphism-elimination 
does not effectively work in this case. 
3=4 6.2 Object Elimination 
SKELALG thus, performs an alternative, more drastic so to speak, 
advice, that is object-elimination. This 'opinion' is apparently 
encouraged from the fact that: LK10Pd # LK10Pm, we found earlier on. 
However, tactical advisor has to find out which object to eliminate. 
This selection is effectively achieved by inpecting TOPOS3 for 
CS, Sp. Nam., object-elimination of i or g (as radiated objects) yields 
a TOPOS3-pattern for {Cj, C9}, {Ci, C3} which is 'much further' from 
TOPOS3-pattern for Cs, C , than object-elimination of j yields. p 
ý. e. TOPOS3 for (C 
1. -j 
), C 
g-j 
) is 'closer' to 
TOPOS3 for Cs, Cp resp. 
Finally, SKELALG after carrying this effective tactical advice, 
it establishes some kind of isomorphism between the reconstructed 
K1, K2 spaces. The phenomenon may be interpreted as some sort of 
econciliation' of K1, K2 structures'. 
Lf, on the other hand, we take the 'similarity viewpoint' of the 
situation, then- the state where SKELALG arrives after the conflict 
resolution, via object-elimination and reconstruction of k-spaces, 
is a set of equivalent classes of k-opens, a fundamental theme in the 
skeletization of k-structures. The skeleton, which illustrates and 
materializes the undergoing process (SIT) we may call it 'carrier 
of reconciliation of the k-structures involved in the dispute'. 
The 'pseudo-isomorphism' captures the commonly shared sub- 
k--structure and the latter may be illustrated as it is shown in the 
schema below. The skeleton E thus formed is of k-structure kind which 
consists of objects and morphisms of the following nature: 
E's objects are equivalent classes of similar Kl, K2's objects; and 
's morphisms are those morphisms of the parents k-structures. 
SKELETON E 
Schema 3.4.6.2. 
3.4.7 APRES MORPHISI`''OBJECT ELIMINATION - DISCUSSION 
In addition to the results we are discussing throughout this 
chapter, we add the following ones: 
1, From the above analysis we can see that a conflict occurs when: 
A. there is a difference in the number of radiated objects; and 
B, there is a difference in the nature of radiated morphisms. 
Thus, the choice of which sort of elimination, OE or ME, should apply, 
was not at all clear and easy to decide. There are, however, cases 
when only one of A or B holds. In this latter situation, a hint or 
advice to which elimination has to be performed is more readily avail- 
able and perhaps, uniquely determined according to which of A or B 
holds. Therefore, we think that we treat a fairly general case of 
k-structure communication, amounting to skeletization of relatively 
speaking, complex scenes. 
2. Expressions used in the last section, as for example 'much further' 
or fclosex! are inherently dealing with some kind of connectivity or 
adjacency of the k-opens which are involved in the skeletization of 
k-structures. These notions naturally amounts to the concept of 
distance between k-opens. Morphism emphasis, is mathematically defined 
in the Appendix. It plays important role in measuring the adjacency 
of k-opens for the purpose of finding out their resemblance or similar- 
ity during the course of comparison stage. Such a connectivity or 
adjacency measure we have used earlier on, nam. ISOL2(CX, Cy), sect. 
3,4,3,. Others, i. e. ISOL1, ISOL3, Dl, D15, D2 and so on, are intro- 
duced in the Appendix. Most of them are, more or less, algebraic 
formulae combining the morphism-emphases for the radiated and 
satellite morphisms. We like to stress a point; that there are various 
levels of similarity between two k-opens. These may be straightforwardly 
defined in terms of the differnet regions into which a k-open can be 
split; nam, TOPOS1, TOPOS2, and TOPOS3 which have been thoroughly 
examined in the present chapter, This differentiation gives a 
departure to an interesting classification scheme of similarity notion, 
i. e. syntactic, contextual, behavioural, semiotic similarity and so on. 
3, The disturbance factor may be, in general, a set of objects or 
morphisms, This situation looks more complicated but, perhaps, not 
so difficult to cope with. We do not provide examples of such 
sophisticated cases. 
3,4.7 ANOTHER EXAMPLE- CASE STUDY 2 
STRUCTURE Kl STRUCTURE K2 
1: left object 
r: right object 
b: block 
w: wedge 
P: "part is" 
S: "supports" 
H: "same height" 
K; "kind of" 
-T: "not touching" 
SKELETON 
3.5 ANALOGICAL INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITIES 
3,5,0 INTRODUCTION 
One of the aims of the present work is to describe some insights 
of an algebraic model (and its mathematical background)of the concept 
of analogy between k-structures; the latter might be loosely considered 
as the case may be, as universes of discourse, conceptual universes or 
even problem-spaces and generally as some sort of nets representing 
knowledge. 
Fundamental to problem-solving, productive/creative thinking 
and cognitive learning are analogical thinking and reasoning. It is 
the conceptualization, discovery, realization, generation and exploi- 
tation of an analogy-, -* between two (or more) different domains of 
knowledge, fields of activities (phenomena or interpretations) or 
universes of discourse which: underlays the solution of an unsolved 
or new problem, forms the basis for finding out a new theorem or 
proof, and suggests innovation and the basis for theory (and method- 
ology) unification; providing thereby the means for economizing and 
effectively utilizing thought; the latter being, what we call else- 
where, 1skeptonomy'^, sect. 2.4.4. 
Root and basic motivation in the conceptualization and develop- 
ment of the present model and also in the formulation of the analogy 
concept as thinking/learning/problem-solving tool, has been the very 
problem of shifting of representation in the human brain, when we 
7: 
ýýýý ý Iº Iº 
Lacking in KLING's (1971) work as he clearly points it out, p. 177. 
HESSE (1963). 
d% 0. Or 'intellectual ergonomics'. 
face new (for example, problem-solving) situations. 
We claim, intuitively, that the discovery and utilization of 
analogies will hopefully lead our ambitions in the correct way of 
achieving this sort of (artificial) intelligence which is attributed 
to creative', productive*', innovative"', not merely mechanical 
thinking which crucially characterizes and differentiates humans from 
other creatures. To support this intuitive feeling, a number of 
suggestions, could be cited, To name but a few, AMAREL, EVANS, 
KLING, SLOMAN, MINSKY, BLEDSOE and so on. 
What our model of analogy amounts to is captured in the following: 
given two k-structures, an analogy between them is understood as 
a functor between them'. 
Finally, as MacCARTHY recently':; suggested and stressed, "a 
conjectual approach to Al and real world problem-solving is what 
we should look forward to in the future". We next present some 
ideas on conjectures and a conjecture generator. 
3,5i1 ON CONJECTURES 
J. J. J. 
nn (b 
Closely connected with analogies are arguments-"-` by analogy, 
I .'1. "1 
.. '. 
Jý 
the so-called conjectures;.:: ':, which mark and underlie major or 
AMAREL (1966), AMOSOV (1975), POINCARE (1913), POLYA (1962) 
WEIRTHEIMER (1961). PASK (1975)b, (1976). 
McKAY C1952), (1959) 
4.. 
IJCAI (1977) conference, held at M. I. T., August 1977, 
'' LLOYD (1958) 
ý` Ql 
ý ý%ýýý For conflicting conjectures, see POLYA (1954) Vol, 2, p, 20. 
minor innovations throughout the historical development of mankind. 
Many examples could be cited here which we shall not discuss due to 
lack of space; POLYA's (1954) Vols. 1 and 2 are full of mathematical 
examples; see also: BURGESS (1969), HESSE (1963), ARBIB (1972), 
LEATHERDALE (1974). The following conjecture-generator may be used 
as a guiding tool for an innovation-generator working in analogizing 
manner, In summary, it is given below: 
1s Scan, observe input data; 
2, Establish, create, compute analogy; 
3, Conceive, describe, formulate conjecture; 
4, Test, validate conjecture; 
5, Accept or reject conjecture. 
Next a more detailed sequence of instructions for a conjecture 
generator is given, based in the so-called 'inductive analogical 
reasoning for conceiving conjectures'; (psychology of invention, 
HAAAMARA (1945)); also POLYA (1954), EVANS (1963). As far as the 
possibility of complete systems of inductive inference is concerned, 
see MELTZER (1970)c. 
Remarks. - 
1, Comparing the above sequence 1 to 5 with the flow-charts on 
"steps in a simulation study' and 'Development of a simulation 
model', MELETIS (1974) App. 3A, 3B, a number of similarities 
can be drawn. 
2. Link conjectures to the concept of "imitationaZ semiotic 
simulation" (recently used in the Institute of Economics, Odessa 
branch, Acad, Sci. Ukr. USSR) as a basis for the development of 
an A. I. approach to the problem of sea economics and ecology. 
3. x. 1.1 A Conjecture Generator 
Suggestive points of contact during an analogizing or conversa- 
tional* situation. 
1.1 Scan, observe existing relations, properties and extract special 
features among given (geometric say) objects. 
1.2 Notice, detect resemblances, symmetries, similarities, 
equivalences, inuariants among observed relations, properties, etc. 
1,3 Form partitions, classify relations and properties, order objects, 
recognize relations which bear similarities, isolate relations, 
analogous to each other by finding correspondances between them 
and common characteristics. 
2.1 Generalize from analogous relations. 
2,2 Abstract to the most possible general relation, (upon what cri- 
teria? ). 
2.3 Formulate clearly the general relation as conjecture. 
Supporting points. 
3,1 Try various cases to validate conjecture (by giving, say, other 
geometric objects or questionning appropriately the system). 
3.2 For every verification increase truth-membership of conjecture. 
Add to its plausibility. 
3.3 Try extreme cases; i. e. minimal or special elements of 
appropriately chosen special sets of objects. 
3.4 Adapt conjecture to reality; i. e. find more 'suggestive points 
of contact" of conjecture with the real world. 
ý PASK (1975)a, (1976). 
3.5 Carry out 'quasi-experiments'; i. e. find other favourable 
signs to increase conjecture's credibility. 
4, If conjecture is not accepted go to end; otherwise: 
4.1 State conjecture. 
4.2 Find and apply formal methods to prove or disprove conjecture. 
4.3 If conjecture doesn't pass theoretical tests, go to end; 
otherwise: 
4q4 State conjecture as some sort of general rule (or even 
a theorem, if you like; thus theorem-generator). 
5ý END it 
3,5.2 ON HARMONIZATION 
We assume that one of human aims, during the course of carrying 
out various sorts of intellectual tasks or even everyday common sense 
activities, is 'the unification/economization and effective utilization 
of thoughts' which we call 'skeptonomy' for reasons we give in sect. 
2.4,4, We claim that this target is, in some way, epistemologically 
and heuristically, at least for a class of problems, feasible via 
appropriate 'harmonization of skeletons' (HS). The latter amounts to 
some sort of intelligent navigation** of skeletons which are amalgams 
of k,, -structures. 
In the case of problem-solving, skeletons could be considered 
or interpreted as representations of abstractions of problem situations; c 
. "... 
Nam. geometric-analogy type; EVANS (1963). 
Or search through a net of analogies. 
as a reduction or 'quotient of problematic theses' notions, to which 
we refer in sects. 2.4.1., 3,4.1., and are made clear later on in this 
chapter, Harmonization of skeletons could become a general cybernetic 
technique, and it may be characterized as a model of (analogical) 
problem-solving, It provides* a methodology towards the choice 
of a desired target problem-situation (problematic thesis 6), via 
appropriately chosen metrics or distances of k-spaces 
In fact, the notion of a k-structure is further analysed and 
a knowledge representation scheme is presented in a subsequent 
chapter entitled 'Prolegomena to a theory of k-structures', for a 
departure into theoretical issues. 
35.3 SHIFTS IN ANALOGICAL PROBLEM-SOLVING 
In the section 3.2, it was mentioned that we conceive the notion 
of shifting of representations during analogizing intellectual acti- 
vities as a sequence (rather a net) of analogies between (skeleton of) 
k«structures. As it turned out from sect. 3.4, a skeleton, the result 
of skeletization, is some kind of k-structure. Loosely speaking, 
it is a sub-k-structure commonly shared by the parent k- structures' 
The results gathered in that section were exemplified via WINSTON's 
(1970) structures, and they were mainly concerned with some issues from 
the domain of learning. We are now going to focus our attention in 
Rather : it is a framework for ... 
Based on skeletization for reduction purposes. 
May be possible that the parents are the same k-structures. 
the area of problem-solving. We assume, however, that both learning 
and problem-solving 
it are genuine intellectual activities; 
2. they do unquestionably require intelligence (sect. 2.2.2); 
3, they could be carried in analogizing manner (or both they 
can undertake the analogical mode); and 
4. these domains are rich in shifts of representations. 
We finally accept that mechanization of shifting of representation 
is a crucial, long term target of A. I. research; AMAREL (1966), 
(1967), (1970) and others. 
Hoping that the present thesis would result some hints towards 
that goal, we next give an informal, brief account from our ideas on the 
mattexl leaving thus the details to be developed in the future. 
In sect. 2.4.1, we informally introduced the notion of shifting 
from a representation., describing a situation, S1, to another represent- 
ation, describing a situation S2, as a kind of correspondance S, map 
if you want, between S1 and S2. Furthermore, a detailed account of 
the factors that S may depend on, was given in 2.4.2. Here, we take 
up again this notion, restricting it, in some sense, into the area of 
analogical problem-solving and wherever that is possible, we provide 
examplex which are concerned with EVANS's (1963) work. 
A number of questions that naturally come up to our mind are: 
what do we mean, in the present context, by: 
1, problem-representation, 
2, shifting of problem-representation, and 
3, mechanization of shifting of problem-representation and 
additionally. 
121. 
4. what the concept of analogy has to do with them? 
5. what role could it play? 
6. can a formal account(model) be devised for analogy? 
We take up this questions again in sects. 3.5.5.5 and 3.5.5.6. 
In the next section, we present an informal description of our 
understanding of problem-solving. 
3,5.4 A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM-SOLVING 
Let it be a given problem to be solved. In a very general sense, 
the course of problem-solving may be loosely or informally described, 
following the same, more or less, phraseology of section 2.4.1, as 
follows : 
A variety of assumed, known, realizable or deducible structures 
E, with various degrees of complexity and relevancy to the problem ff 
In question, pass* through the mind of problem-solver, say A. Then 
A is trying to choose, with some epistemological adequacy, that 
appropriate structure which 'pseudo-semiotically' is related (or match 
in a stronger sense) to the current problem-situation or problematic 
thesis, say structure 6x; (Ocuis: Greek for situation). This corre- 
lation or matching may be conceived as a map between the structure 
6X and one of the structures Z. Ir 
Thus, X proceeds constructing, heuristically, a partially 
reasonable sequence (generally net) of correspondances öi between 
®ý , stýuetures; nam, 
122. 
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ý ý ox ) TT rr 
IT 
H--ý ýý (8ý)5 iEIC IC 
where, p" is a collection of k-structures, the set of problematic 
situations or theses the problem-solver A is going through, 
trying to solve problem Tr 
I is an index set, subset of integers II. 
indicates an arbitrary problem-solver and it may be 
omitted from S.. 
i 
E) 
if may consider 
the set of all possible problematic situations 
for 7r . 
If sequence Si, a-approximately converges (if at all) to some 
stable desirable target structure 6g, hopefully the required one, then 
Tr 
we may say teat 'problem 7r is solved by X with tolerance a 
In order to make the above general problem-solving activity 
a little more concrete, and also to get an idea how a trip into the 
'labyrinth of cybernetics' problematique' looks like, we felt the need 
to investigate some aspects of intellectual activities involved in 
problem-solving (PS) and especially its mode under the title of 
analogical problem-solving(APS). Another reason was that we wanted 
to focus our attention on the shifts involved in PS and, in fact, its 
analogical mode, nam. APS which involves a large number of shifts, 
Finally, we close this section by a brief sentence which might 
give the flavour of PS; nam,, "problem-solving may be considered 
as the process of acquiring an appropriate set of responses to a 
situation"; GEORGE (1976). 
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3.5.5 A MODEL OF ANALOGY 
3.5.5.1 On Analogical Problem Solving 
In the present section, a rather brief account of results is 
given on matters involving the six-tuple of questions which we have 
put forward in section 3.5.6. Thus, the following should be more or 
less considered as a (naive or preliminary if you wish) platform for 
a departure into more rigorous investigations and theoretical concept- 
ualizations. 
We rather concentrate on analogical problem-solving (APS) and 
we elaborate on some possible answers to the above questions by 
giving mathematical descriptions for the concepts involved (wherever 
that is feasible) based on the rather extensive theoretical framework 
provided by the first sections (3,1,3.2) the present chapter. 
We exemplify these notions by presenting a reformulation of 
EVANS (. 1963) descriptions in a concise manner. For this was one of 
our objectives, described in section 2.7; nam. the clarification of 
the obscure, in some ways, use of 'objects' and 'transformations' 
referred to by EVANS (1963). 
3,5,5.2 Applications in Evans' problem-domain 
To begin with, we understand a representation of problem it as a 
k-structure 0 which may describe it or capture its meaning. For 
example, in EVANS's case, a problem situation, which we call 
'problematic 
thesis' is a snapshot/instance of activity field of affairs and we 
describe it in terms of k-structures. To be more precise Evans's 
it is tacitly assumed that this is feasible. 
124. 
classic A. I. programme solved geometric-analogy problem which may 
have the following forms: (use schemata El'E2'E3) 
1. "figure A is to figure B as figure C is to which of the given 
answer figure x, xeX? " 
2. briefly: "A is to B as C is to x", xcX; 
3. diagrammatically l is to l as is toll, xeX, 
AC 
4ý correct analogizing schema: is related to As is related to 
B 
AC 
5. symbolically: {A: B:: C: x }; or xý Bx 
6, as a problematic thesis: 
ex 
-- it 
A 
is to as 
c 
is to 
Bx 
a 
7. or 
L8ý 
as 
R8n 
11 X£X 
X 
L; for left k-structure 
R: for right k-structure 
and via the notion of a functor f: K1 ? K2 between two k-struc- 
tures, developed in sect. 3.1.8. we may describe or capture the 
above (in 7. ) 'as' relation or correspondence as follows: 
fý *. 
L8ý 
--bºR6ý !> xEX. 
84ý. Metalinguistic level. Let us take into account two of the 
assumptions made so far; 
I. In section 3.1.11 we point out that k--structures may play the 
role of objects in a k-structure*. 
IT. The general algebraic meaning of 'a morphism', sect. 3,1.4. 
is that of 'a function which preserves structure'. 
According to I and II and by intuitively interpreting the word 
tas' in the above schemate, as some sort of similarity (resemblance-') 
between the two corresponding 'members' which might somehow capture 
or embody the preservation of a structure, then we may consider fx n 
in 8t (above) as a morphism between 
L0 x and 
Rey; 
the latter being 
now considered as objects. This move actually changes the level 
of description, nam, we are dealing with a 'higher' k-structure which 
objects are k-structures and morphisms are functors. 
Furthermore, in section 3.1.4, the notions of domain D(m) and 
range R(m) of a morphism m were introduced. Therefore, in a metalin- 
guistic level the expression (8) may be simply written: 
f: D(f) °-----3- RUE) 
The raison d'etre of this departure into metalinguistic issues, 
it 
will soon be made clear. 
This is perhaps not always true; discussion on this 
issue is of 
great challenge (why? ). The question 
is partially taken up 
again in sect. 2.4,4.2. 
.... Correlation or even analogy. 
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Schema E2 
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I 
Schema E3 
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3.5.3.3 Some Theorem Schemata on Analogical Problem-Solving 
According to the previously described schematology, therefore, 
Analogical Problem Solving, for EVANS's problem-domain, may be 
summarized in the following theorem-like schemata: 
Given : figures A, B, C and x. EX 
I 
0l I 
z Find : xeX such that d{A: B:: C: x} = min d{A: B:: C: x. } 
i 
o1,, via C8) of the previous section, 
X 
02 
E 
Given :f 
7T 
: 
LaIt Xýý----» Rex 
0 
7f 
X1 
set of problematic theses 1 
Find : fX such that it 
}{. X. 
V e>o 36(s)>o : dll (fý 5 fýl)<ýý 
ReIT 
X R (Reý Reý) <s(e) 
or, via (8') of the previous section, 
V 
0 
E 
X. X. X. 
Given : f7T 
1: D(fIT 1)-)p R(f,, 1), set of morphisms 
Find : fx such that 
v. 
9. '' E->>0 As:. 
}ý 
, ýý))<Eýc, 
YfX 
o: d21 (R(fý), R(f 
x 
7r 
X. 
d22 (fýrýýfý)ýg;: (E 
where d; dll, d12 , d21 9d 22 are appropriately 
defined metrics/measures 
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3.5.5.4 Interpreting 01,02,03 
To put 01,0,03 in more illustrative terms, we may say; 
for 01 that: from the next patterns or problem-situations: 
AC 
is to as is to 
Bx 
choose the one which makes d' minimum; 
where d' is a metric in 
problem-space. 
AC 
is to as is to 
B 
AC 
is to as is to 
B 
Ac 
is to as is to 
B x_ 
AC 
is to as is to 
B x4 
SCHEMA S1 
In the same way for 02, that from the following problematic theses: 
fX . 
L6X----ý Rx 
Tr ý Tr 
xl 
f 
71' 
x 
f 
IT 
.L 
exl----a 
Re x2 
T, - "ý 
Xl R X2 
O 
7r ----. ,6ý 
x3 
f: 
7T 
x 
f 
Tr 
SCHEMA S2 
which are described by functors fs, 
choose the one, via appropriate selection of a natural transforma- 
tion c (section 3,1.9), which makesOa"natural equivalence" of the 
functors fý and the answer f7r 2 in other words, choose that which 
brings them 'very close'. 
132. 
Finally, we have for 0. that: from the following problematic theses: 
SCHEMA S 
3 
ý 
ý_ 
-(ýOM 
Which are described by the domains Ds and ranges* Rs of morphisms ; 
fs, choose that morphism, via appropriate selection of a functor';; %ý q 
which makes 4M, the morphism component of the functor ý (Sect. 3.1.8), 
to bring 'as close as possible' the two morphisms fIT and the 
answer one fa 11 
(Note that IT is sometimes omitted for clarification) 
ý. 
.. . .. ý. 
k-Structures. 
Functors between k-structures. 
?; º Endo-functors, i. e. +: C -} C, where C is a 
k-structure made up 
from Ds, Rs as objects and fs as morphisms. 
3.5.5.5 Applying theorem schemata to the shifting of representations 
and its mechanization. 
Taking into account the previous schematology, we are now going 
back to section 3.5,3 to provide some answers to the rest of the 
sixtuple of questions, 
The shifting of representation has to be divided into two parts. 
The first is some kind of internal shifting, let us call it horizontal 
X. 
shifting, and it may be described via the functors fIT l, schema S2, 
which map left k-structures to right k-structures. This shifting 
may be controlled by a second type of shifting which is describable 
as a correspondence 0 between two fs. Let us call it methodology or 
vertical shifting 
Thus what the mechanization of shifting amounts to is an appro- 
priate choice of a map ý, i. e. method, which it would assign a 
transformation f to a 'much better' one, and eventually into the 
solution. The formalization of the mechanization of shifting may 
I 
be captured via the theorem-schema 0 2, sect. 3.5.1.0. 
3: 5.5.6 On analogy and its role in Shifting of Representations 
As far as the notion of analogy is concerned, we say that it 
amounts to the following: given two k-structures, an analogy between 
them may be described and understood as some kind of map/function 
between them. In fact, it may be illustrated as a functor (sect. 
3,1,8) between them". 
Furthermore, a skeleton may be considered as an embodiment 
oz an analogy. 
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The role of analogy in shifting is to bring about the maximum 
resemblance/similarity between the two parents k-structures. 
Controlling a family of analogies, i. e. fs, is to choose 
an appropriate transformation O, see theorem-schema 02 and schema 
S2, which it would bring two fs 'very close' as it is formalized by 
0 2. 
Which is the main job of harmonization (Sect. 3.5.2), 
135. 
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"La scolastique, qui produisit dans la logique, 
eornrne dans la morale, et dans une partie de la 
metaphysique, une subtiZite, une precision 
d'idees, dont l'habitude inconnue aux anciens, 
-a contribue plus qu'on ne croit au progres 
de la bonne phi losophie" 
CONDORCET 
Vie de Turgot 
137. 
PROLEGOMENA TO k-THEORY 
4.1 'SLOW MOTION' CONSTRUCTION OF A k-STRUCTURE 
We start with a construction which steems from a basic fact, 
mentioned throughout our work; that is, the morphisms are the most 
important constituents of a k"structure; the latter has been introduced 
in 3.1,4. We are next giving an informal construction for a k-structure 
Cand thus for a skeleton section 3.4, considered as made up from attri- 
butes of a nature similar to those of a k-structure). A k-structure 
may be viewed as a sort of 'Superposition of many morphisms' (say for 
ex. relations). This, in set theoretic terms, may be repharased as 
'superposition of the cartesian products (graphs) of relations'. Thus, 
a krstructure's realization/derivation could be based on 'consecutive 
embedding of morphisms' technique, which is achieved via the following 
two (macro-) steps: 
Th 
MSTEP 1 -- Embed identities; that is, identify morphisms of objects of 
a k-structure, An interpretation of that MSTEP could be: 
supplying a 'pool with objects; a metaphor also used in 
Ch, 3. 
MSTEP 2: Embed genuine morphisms; i. e. filling the 'pool' with pure 
morphisms. 
The whole business of MSTEP 1 and MSTEP 2 might be captured in 
the following sentence: "Establishing links between objects". Next, 
we give a 'slow-motiont or piecewise construction of a k-structure 
via morphisms. Schemata 1-10 and 11-14%** constitute MSTEP 1 and 
MSTEP 2 respectively. 
Yielding the schema E, shown later on, which illustrates the result 
for a construction of a skeleton for analogy-type problematic 
thesis, that of sect. 3.3.1. 
:: We omit the labelling of identities to make them clear. 
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Note that: 
{#steps} _ {#objects} + {#morphisms} 
{#identity moxphisms} + {#genuine morphisms} 
where # denotes 'the number of... ' 
The so-described 'slow-motion' construction, reminds one some 
sort of 'cellular-like organism in evolution'* so to speak. Each 
figure may be considered as representing a snapshot of the above men- 
tioned 'pool', a picture of which is given below, at the end of MSTEP 1. 
ý, . le CD 
p1e 
A. pi ° c . -. c --.. r-- 
A. p. 
if pif 
ý. Pi 
ii -v 
p. 
p. lb lb 1. h 7jl ., iý piý 
ýi Pi 
ww 
Left and right identity morphisms (A.., p.. ) are 'floating', randomly 
around in the pool, until a genuine (invoked) morphism eventually 
links some of them up. This 'eventuality' depends in the case of a 
skeleton's construction, on the current content of the skeletization 
Universe. The so-characterized random movements in the pool, gives rise 
to talk about 'pending objects' and 'dangling morphisms'. Other names of 
the latter situation are: "uninstantiated (objects)" used by SUSSMAN 
(1975) and SACERDOTI (1975); and in the skeleton case, embeding 
Which is linked to issues on cellular, Von Neuman (1966), and 
tesselation automata, for self-reproduction and evolution. 
ýý 
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I 
\/ 
SKELETON 
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morphisms over 'invisible' (skeleton's) objects. 
Finally, we may consider the present section as some kind of 
interface between k-structures and the Knowledge Representation 
Structures (KRS) which we are going to analyse next. 
4.2 KRS STRUCTURES 
4,2,0 INTRODUCTION 
Knowledge Representation Structures (KRS) are variants of k- 
structures in their full generality. That is, a KRS: 
1. Incorporates/materializes all the mathematical features of a 
k-structure. 
2. Accommodates, nicely, the very concept of 'drasis"; to be intro- 
duced later for conflict resolution in interaction of k-structures. 
In a KRS, objects may be assumed as some sort of tacit knowledge; 
in their place, the so-called reverse type m-mixer * is 
positioned, resulting thus in a structure consisting mainly from: 
A. morphisms; and 
B. morphism-mixers. 
Finally, in a KRS, the 'invisible' objects and morphisms may be 
almost anything. On a possible criticism of that statement, see section 
3,1,1,0, 
.. .. Which is introduced in Sect, 4,2.3. 
ýý; Introduced in Sect. 4,2.2, 
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4.2.1 THE SHIFT FROM k-STRUCTURE TO KRS 
We brief here on the shifting from a k-structure of objects 
and morphisms to a knowledge representation structure which is simply 
a representational extension of a k-structure; some reasons for doing 
this shifting are given later, sect. 4.2.3 0 
Let K= (K, M, I) be a k-structure, of objects K, and morphisms 
M. Where I is its identity function, defined as follows: details 
in sects. 3.1.4 and 3.1.12. 
T: K --, 1 M 
:X F-ý I(X) = ix :_ 'identity morphism of object V. (R) 
Furthermore, from the sect. 3.1.3 on semigroupoids, and k-structures, 
sect. 3.1.4., we have that M is a regular semigroupoid (RSGD); thus, 
for every genuine morphism pcM, there is only one left and right identity 
morphism such that: X op=p=pop11 
Finally, from (R) above, we have: VXcK I(X) = iXeM; 
thus, V ixcM there is only one left and right identity morphism: 
A] " oi X =i X =i X opi XX 
These additional (micro-)features of a k-structure led us to 
the introduction of the following Schematology as some kind of phrase- 
ology for KRS. 
*Xix = pix; we differentiate them for schematic reasons. 
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4.2.2 A SCHEMATOLOGY FOR KRS 
DIAGRAM 
-0__ 
ý)O- 
Dl 
D2 
NAME- 
identity-composer U-mixer) 
or reverse `s type m-mixer, ' 
see diagram D) 
m-synthesizer 
m-analyser 
3 
xm 
mmpm 
D4 (genuine) m-composer ýp 
I 
0 D5 drasis point examples are given in 
sects. 4.2.3 and 4.3. 
Di, i=l,..., 5 may be unified in the following diagram: 
D: vl -*11, - v., morphism mixer (m-mixer) 
where: v1 >, 0, v2 ?0 is the number of in(out) going morphisms. 
"}ý 4. 
. ".. . llIf 
'm-E stands for 'morphism-'. 
In the case where morphisms are allowed to be stored as objects also, 
then i-mixer takes the form of an m-reverse which somehow reverses 
a morphism. See, for a similar case, in p. 23-24 WINSTON 
(1970) 
when relations are considered as nodes. 
EXAMPLE 
fix pi 
Common 
"" """^ Kybernetes 
---C. ý" """" Terminal 
m2 
m 1 m_ 
4.2.2.1 KRS Schemata 
In order to get the flavour of a Knowledge Representation Struc- 
ture (it is just an extended form of a k-structure), an analogy-type 
problematic thesis (that of sect. 3.3,1) is sketched in the following 
schema: (objects are somehow supressed to emphasize morphisms) 
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Skeleton 
146. 
REMARKS 
1. In KRS pharaselology, an object X may be represented as; 
X=< TQ; ix, pi 
x; 
Q, a> or 
where: Ili : left identity of morphism i 
xx 
Pi 
x: 
right identity of ix 
Q: m-synthesizer 
a: m-analyser 
TQ : (X's) identity composer; (i. e. X's qualities, 
attributes, features, etc., see sect. 3.1.12). 
2, vl ý 0, v2 > 0 (see diagram D, sect. 4.2.2), 
We assume that vl, v2 are not both equal to zero, simultaneously. In this 
case, i. e. when vl =0 and v2 = 0, we have the so-called isolated (non- 
interactive) object. 
.. 
ýý.. 
kybernetes ß terminaZa 
3. Thus, a condition for 'isolation' comes out quite straight- 
forward according to the above representations. 
4. A (genuine) morphism m is never composed directly to an identity 
morphism of an object Y.. This is done via(Xm), pm; i. e. 
... 
ým Pm 
l tiý 
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Thus XM, pm are acting as some kind of 'interface' so to speak, morphisms. 
4.2.3 ON THE NOTION OF DRASIS 
4.2.3.0 Introduction 
The drasis concept invoked from k-structures interaction. It has 
been created, basides other possible uses, to cure and remediate a 
conflict situation in such an interaction. It is catered for accommo- 
dation of decision-making and organization mechanisms. Drasis facili- 
tates Analogizing for it helps in dilemma resolution. It underlies 
and illuminates a shifting between two k-structures. In fact, the 
conceptualization of drasis came up after a thorough investigation of 
a k-open's components, from a number of standpoints; i. e. algebraic, 
topological, operational and mainly structural. 
4,2,3,1 Role, representation, nature, utilization 
Drasis plays the role of some sort of conflict-resolving clue. 
It is a corner-stone in a communication (considered as interaction of 
k-structures) when the latter is in the analogizing mode. In an extended 
k-structure (KRS), drasis is a conflict-causing m-composer. 
> 
>c 
From the k-open's point of view, sect. 3.2.1, drasis is a fundamental 
(procedural) feature of a k-open in a k-space. Generally, 
it is a 
morphism mixer (m-mixer) in the sense of the earlier given schematology. 
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Drasis may be utilized as catalyst (effector) for elimination of 
semiotic differences between k-structures or to decrease some dissimi- 
larity between them. That is, it brings together k-structures or 
parts of them. 
The introduction of Drasis concept may be served as a useful 
framework for a better conceptual understanding and effective opera- 
tional use of another vital notion, that of Local Control Quantum 
(LCQ) during the course of skeletization process. LCQ is also fund- 
amental in the study of non-hierarchical systems via what we call 
Local Kybernetes; a theme for future investigation. Drasis is, 
in some sense, the materialization/realization of LCQ and LCQ is 
the conceptualization of Drasis. 
4.2.3,2 Properties 
The main property of drasis is that of conflict/dilemma/deadlock 
resolution. Furthermore, it facilitates type-2 shifting, that is 
shifting between tactics or methodologies. More on shifting-2 in 
sect. 2.4.3. and sect. 2.2.2 'on intelligence. Drasis is an m-composer 
with the property of interlinking parallel (sub-)tasks or processes 
, which may be represented as (sub-) k-structures; and in more technical 
terms; communicating task 1Is m-composers and m-synthesizers 
to those 
of task2. 
This is a tentative suggestion of parallel computation. 
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4.2.3.3 Functions 
1. Drasis considered as an m-composer, it composes a morphism 
coming into an m-synthesizer (ingoing morphism) with its right identi- 
ty morphism or it composes a morphism coming out from an m-analyser 
(outgoing morphism) with its left identity morphism. 
2, It generally joins or composes morphisms. 
4.2.3.4 Tanonomy of drasis 
I. Types of drasis 
Auu pu 
1. Genuine or pure or non-terminal drasis; eg. u o--. t. ý0 
2. Kybernetes drasis, eg. 
1-01ý 
Terminal drasis, eg. 
I]. Remarks 
1, Drasis is a sort of action or decision making point in an exten- 
ded k-structure (KRS). 
2. It is a place in a problem-space or control space, where a vital 
decision is going to be taken, with immediate implications on the 
structural (and semiotic) features of the conceptual Universe, or 
k'-structure under investigation. 
3, It is a noise point, from the fact that its morphism environment 
": 
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disturbs the (semiotic) similarity of two Universes of Discourse, 
k--structures or Knowledge structures, 
4. it is a choice point, ASHBY (1956); or a distinction point. 
5. Finally, it is a disturbance point because it interfers between 
two parallel processes or tasks causing conflicts. 
6. Dijkstra's semaphor is a loose analogy of a drasis point. 
4.3 CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
4.3.0 INTRODUCTION 
A question which naturally arises at this point, from what has 
been said so far; nam., How can we distinguish or differentiate an 
m-composer as being a drasis? (Q). We, therefore, need to devise some 
criteria for drasis point identification. 
Up to now, the following suggestions have been detected, allowing 
for computable criteria to be developed; that is, structural (semiotic) 
dissimilarity in terms of neighbouring m-synthesizers, i. e. 
C3 
if X= X : --ýýº ßl = Q2 ý 
c' 1 
Cl 
2 
C1, C2, C3}I must I{C1t, C2'}Iý 
be 
That is, from n)--composers Cl, C21C3, there is one which might play 
the 
role of a drasis point, Where, denotes the power or cardinality 
of a set, 
151. 
A suggestive point for the existence of a drasis point is a 
jumping/crossover in a (2-D) plannar arrangement of a k-structure, 
representing, say, a task structure or a project network or a planning 
net or even a circuit in the sense of ROSE's(1970) work: Computer- 
aided circuit design, and SUSSMANts (1977) : Electrical Design, a 
problem for A. I. research. 
ý 
The above question (Q) may be restated in the terminology of 
parallel computation/programming; nam., 'How can we identify parallel 
processes or coroutines? ' (the latter in KNUTH's(1961) terms; see also 
KOWALSKI (1975) p. 591. ) 
4.3.1 REMARK (m. e. d. ) 
We don't deal directly with this question in the present work. 
We leave it for the future. However, we think that such an identifi- 
cation is somehow achievable if one would follow the work of DASGUPTA- 
JACKSON (1973). Finally, in a similar manner, perhaps, an answer might 
be given to the question: 'How can we identify conflicting parallel 
tasks represented as k-structures and more general as knowledge 
representation structures? ' . We rather 
deal with questions like: 
'Given two (or more) analogous or parallel k-structures with the phenom- 
enon of dilemma/conflict/deadlock upon them, due to some sort of 
(semiotic) dissimilarity, what can we do to resolve it? '. This question 
gives rise to compute the set of drasis points and develop or 
rather impose upon it some measure of effectiveness or significance of 
drasis points which may amount to the creation of some notion of 
most'effeetive drasis (m, e. d, ) which actually plays 
important role 
The term reminds one of the notion of 'most general unifier" 
(m. g. u. ) 
KOWALSKI (1975), and "most common divisor" in arithmetic. 
Someone 
going deeper in these matters could find similarities. 
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in conflict resolution as we shall see next. The procedure of the 
following section is one of the main results of our investigations. 
4,3,2 A METHOD TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS IN KRS 
The following procedure is a suggestion for conflict resolution 
in kistructuresf interaction using: 
As their extended representations, i. e. KRIS; 
B. the above introduced concepts of drasis points and most effective 
drasis (m, e. d. ); and 
C. operations like morphism and object eliminations (ME or OE) 
introduced in sect. 3.4.6. 
The procedure may be illustrated using the KRS schemata of section 
4.2.2.1. 
We next give an outline of its sequence of steps: 
STEP 1: identify terminal i-mixers via their right dead ends, i. e. 
right identity morphisms. 
STEP 2: Locate terminals' m-synthesizers by inspection or scanning 
of terminals' left identity morphisms. 
STEP 3; Compare m-synthesizers carrying out syntactic or geometric 
comparisons based on numerical computations. 
STEP 4: Take notes of any dissimilarity or differences during the 
above comparisons. 
STEP 5: Identify terminal drasis points; i. e. m-mixer locations where 
conflicts happen, 
STEP 6; Identify the most effective drasis (m. e. d. ) A via some sort 
of ýlook! aheadl computations and reasoning. 
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STEP 7: Eliminate m. e. d. A and its morphism-like environment. 
STEP 8: Carry on by eliminating Q's 'closest' m-analyser which is 
apparently uniquely determined. 
STEP 9; Proceed with relevant morphism eliminations MME), eliminating 
thus the 'noise' morphisms; and object-eliminations OE (rather 
i-mixer eliminations), eliminating the 'noise' objects. 
STEP 10; Filtrate the remaining terminals-. 
STEP 11; Amalgate filtrations. 
STEP 12: Validity, correctness. Check the remainder m-composers for 
validation; for ex, is {K1's m-composers} {K2's m-composers}? 
STEP 13: Proceed towards synthesizing skeleton in k-structure form. 
Remark 1. - Both filtration and amalgamation operations (c and a 
resp. ) are defined in subsequent sections of the present chapter 
Remark 2. - The steps 9 up to 13 are useful when apart from conflict 
resolution, skeletization is also needed. 
4.4.1 ON FILTRATION 
The nature of filtration (4), in the present work, is understood 
as a binary operation on a k-space. It takes place between two k-opens. 
A formal definition of 4 is given below: 
ý: KSPxKSP r SKEL 
: (01)02) aý ,ý 
(01,02) ý ý0V0 
2 
: ={{R00 U R00 {RMO U RM0 
2 
{SMO 
1U 
SMO 
2 
}} U {AM} 
121 
As well as the remaining genuine objects 
(i-mixers in KRS terms) 
in an appropriate manner, 
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where, 01,02 are k-opens; 
R0, RM are the radiated objects and morphisms resp, 
SM are the satellite morphisms 
AM are the 'additional morphismsT, and 
SKEL is the skeletization universe. 
For an example, see schema 4.4.1, 
Remarks 
We refer to k-structures (hence to k-spaces) and not to KRS so 
that definitions and schemata become simpler. 
2. $ might be generally defined as an n-ary operation on k-spaces. 
3. In schema 4.4.1, the dotted satellite morphisms in the result of 
4, 's application are examples of what we called in the definition 
of 4,, 'additional morphisms' AM. 
4. The raison d'etre of an additional morphism is the existence of 
a dangling morphism which may spring off a radiated object in 
one of the 4, 's operands. 
5. A k-space is not closed (in set theoretic terms) under ý operation. 
In the case where ý is applied between terminals (e. g. w's and 
b's section 3.3), then we call it 'low-level concept filtering process' 
or 'terminals' ý' or 'elementary q'. To give an interpretation of the 
act of filtration in the way we understand it, we say that when ý is 
applied then filtration of a k-open through another k-open takes place, 
as for example in a 'permeable filter' in brain theory terms. It is 
important to notice here that some radiated objects of the k-opens which 
take part in c, may be sources of dangling morphisms which are 
invisible 
in a k'opens schema. Thus, after 4 has been applied, it may be possible 
that some radiated objects, in the resulting k-open, are linked with 
/ 
morphisms which are not explicitely referred to in the parent k-opens 
which take part in the filtration. Therefore, new (dotted) satellite 
morphisms, called additional morphisms (AM), have to be created and 
established. 
Schema 4.4.1 
Ol 
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0 
02 
a 
OP2; 
Schema 4.4.2 
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4.4.2 ON AMALGAMATION 
Informal introduction. Amalgamation (a) is a binary operation on 
k-spaces. a Takes place between two k-opens, either ordinary (typical) 
or terminal ones. We are at the moment interested for terminal's 
amalgamation, because terminals play the most important role in 
conflict resolution and concept formation via filtrations (otherwise 
concept filtering). 
Amalgamation a may be considered, somehow, similar to the well known 
unification; the latter in the sense of NILSSON (1971), KOW. ALSKI (1975). 
The binary nature of a can be straightforward generalized into an n-ary 
operation. 
Formally, amalgamation operation a is defined as: 
a: K1SP X K2SP --i SKEL 
" (OP12 OP2 ) r--s (OP1, OP2 )= a0P 
1OP 12 
where KSP stands for a k-space. For an example see schema 4.4.2. 
We next put forward two important questions: 
Question 1; How can amalgamation be achieved? 
Question 2: What are the criteria and conditions under which amalgama- 
tion a is feasible? 
The following remarks build upon terminology introduced 
in sects. 3.2. 
and 3,2.3, mainly elaborate on question 2, that 
is, 
let two k-structures C1 = (K1, M1, I1), C2 = (K2, M2, i2) 
In fact, filtrated k-opens in the case of conflict resolution. 
is external operation on KSPs; i. e. the result of a 
is not 
in KSP or KSPs is not closed under a. 
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and also two k-opens gl, g2 ingredients of Cl, C2-spaces; nam., 
ql (T1 T2, T3) (S1, M1, P1) 
q2 
ý 
iTi, 
T2, T3) 
Then, amalgamation between two k-opens is feasible iff the following 
'Amalgamation Conditions' (AC) are true: 
AC1 : Ti T1 
AC2 : T2 = T2 
AC3 : T3 = T3 
Where, T. is the TOPOS1 in the topological sense mentioned in sect. 3.2 
and Sj, Mj, P. may be, loosely, considered as some sort of syntactic, 
seimantic and pragmatic environment respectively. These conditions are 
equivalent to the following ones: (in terms defined in section 3.2). 
R 
I AC1 : {centre object for q1} = {centre object for q2} 
a1 
's radiated ob's. } AC21 :{ #-q 1s radiated objs. 
} {ßq2 
a21 
I 
AC22: Is radiated morphisms} _ 
a22 
f, { 's radiated morphisms} 
ACý3 :{ ql's satellite morphisms} = 
{k's satellite morphisms} 
N 
u 
3 
where: R is some external posited similarity, 
in other words a priori 
hint. In the case study we refer to (sect. 3.3.1), 
R is 'LEFT = RIGHT'. 
(al, a2l, a22, a3) is a quantative tolerance; and 
(gl, g2)EK1SP X K2SP. 
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4.4.3 APRES AMALGAMATION a AND FILTRATION q 
(General remarks; discussion; and partial conclusions) 
1. Amalgamation of two k-opens intuitively leads to and is inherently 
connected to the notions of abstraction and generalization, i. e. we may 
say that a machine abstracts or generalizes via amalgamation operation. 
2. Amalgamation takes place between objects and morphisms of a number 
of 'homogeneous' k-opens; this is one of the reasons that in most 
cases we first 'filtrate' k-opens, via 4, i. e. to become topologically 
comparable and compatible. 
3, Talking in algebraic terms, i. e. equivalences, quotient set, etc., 
we. may say that the actual result amalgamation operation amounts to is 
a representative of an equivalent class of similar objects or k-opens 
(in k-structure or k-space terms respectively). 
4. Generally speaking, there are, or at least we arrive at, two main 
modes of amalgamation and filtration operations; nam., 
A. amalgamation or filtration with morphism elimination (ME); and 
B. amalgamation or filtration with object elimination (OE). 
Both (ME) and (OE) have been studied and elaborated in section 3.5.1. 
As far as questions like: 'which of (ME) or (OE) is better to be 
carried out first' is an open question which we investigate in sect. 3.4.6. 
5. As far as the future is concerned, we intuitively believe that 
'efficient combination of amalgamation and filtration operations' 
(with 
object or morphism eliminations) with the so-called 
"n-level look 
ahead computation" in terms of KOWALSKI (1975), may 
lead ourselves to an 
intelligent search strategy. In fact, Kowalski's connection graphs 
utilize syntactic similarity to facilitate look-ahead. 
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6. By combining amalgamation and filtration appropriately, we may 
well find, in the future, what kind of network relations (morphisms) 
are adequate for describing a model of "human functional thinking" 
referred to by WINSTON (1970) p. 172. Also AMOSOV (1967) provides an 
obscure model of thinking processes for a departure into future 
investigations. 
7. The identity morphisms, such as iX, iy... of terminal objects are 
quite important and they play a vital role in the filtration operation. 
8. Filtration is the operation which, in many instances, acts as 
a fundamental requirement for amalgamation. Filtration yields the 
appropriate 'Domains D and 'Range' R for a quasi- or pseudo-isomor- 
phism between two k-spaces Kl, K2; while amalgamation is the effectual 
carrier of K1; K2 similarity vital to analogizing. 
9. Worthwhile, here, I think is to point out the recent attempt of 
CHAVCHANIDJE (1976), reviewed by SCHUKIN (1977) on "concept filtering" 
and "a conceptual model of A. I. ", which despite it being a little 
obscure, at least to us, it emphasizes the transition from cybernetics 
ideas into Brain theory; a striking difference between the Georgian 
Cybernetic Institute and Western A. I. centres. 
10. From the Analysis-Synthesis viewpoint, we conclude that during 
Analysis phase (say, for example in skeletization), we are carrying 
out filtrations; while, in synthesis stage, what mainly 
dominates 
is amalgamation. It is also interesting to apply the above conclusion 
in a conflict resolution situation viewed from the 
Analysis-Synthesis 
standpoint. 
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4.5.1 ON CONCEPTS 
A k-open is introduced in section 3.2 and somehow interpreted 
as the context of a concept. Furthermore, what was really achieved 
from constructing a k-space (sect. 3.2) amounts to the separation of 
I 
the context of a concept from the concept itself. 
From the other hand, we may say that the previously introduced 
operation of filtration ý concentrates or condenses two or more k-opens 
while amalgamation a unifies two or more (filtrated) k'-opens. 
Let us consider a concept as 'a sequence of (similar) contexts'. 
i. e. {C. 
i}i dI 
In terms of k-opens, the above sentence becomes: 
a sequence of (similar) k-opens. More precisely, and taking into 
account 4 and a operations, concept formation amounts to: 'the 
construction of a (directed) sequence (or net) of amalgamations of 
(similar) k-opens OP1'. The role of filtration here is emphatically 
present. To elaborate we simply say that k-opens OPI usually are the 
result of filtrations. 
The obscure speculations made loosely so far, lead on to the 
notion of understanding or learning of a concept if we intuitively 
assume that: 'we say we learn or understand something new if our minds 
stabilize to some conception which more or less represents a class of 
similar conceptions'. 
4,5.2 DEFINITION 
.L 
ýt i. 
We may say that R understand (learns or forms) a concept a 
Rather a net. 
This expression can be fruitfully used for a 
departure into topo- 
logical. notions in k-structures, as for ex., convergence, continuity, eti 
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iff 'a sequence (rather a net) CRi of similar contexts converges'; 
in other words, iff 
3cj : lim CR =Q OYE>o 3S(c) >o : d(CR, Q)<E, di: i>d(c: ) 
i 
whereciis some metric. 
Remark. - CR may be characterized as 'point of view' or 'partial 
opinion' of R. 
Let Rl, R2 understand a concept a. As we are interested in 
analogizing intellectual activities, we are curious to see whether Rl, R2 
may have a common understanding of a concept. The intuitive appeal 
of the notion of a sequence leads us to conceive of it as two equally 
converging sequences of contexts, as the following proposition 
asserts: 
4,5.3 PROPOSITION 
If R12R2 understand separately a concept 
common understanding of concept a iff 
VF->o 3 S(E)>o :d (CCR2) < iý 
Proof 
From hypothesis we have: 
E., dl5] 
R 
'VE1>o 
-36 1(El)>o : 
d(Ci1, Q)<E1 1 
R 
VE2>o 3s2(E2)>o : d(Ci2, Q)<E2 I 
Vi 
d7 
a then R1, R2 have a 
i Ii i 8(E) 
>s 1 
(E1) 
>s2(E2) 
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Thus, 
d( CRl , CR2)* 
/d( CRl o' )+d( CR2 Q<e+ iý i' ý ,)1 e2 
Vi, j : iýý ' ö(e) = max c 1), ö2(£2)} 
Therefore, if c: = E1 +62 and 5(c): = max {61(E2), 6 2(E2)}, then 
V E>o 3 S(E)>o : d(C1 
Rl, 
CýR2) <E, di, j : i"j <S(e) 
I( 
i. e. the two sequences of partial opinions of Rl, R2 are equally 
converging. 
4,6, SUMMARY DISCUSSION ON OPERATIONS INTRODUCED SO FAR 
The following operations have been introduced: 
1. Object elimination (OE) or o-c 
2. Morphism elimination (ME) or m-c; 
3. Filtration 4; 
4. Amalgamation a. 
OE and ME are unary operations, while and a are binary ones. 
Furthermore, in sect. 4,2.3.2 we introduced the concepts of 
conflict causing m-synthesizer and m-composer which led to the following 
operation: 
5, T: identification of conflict-causing parallel or analogous 
tasks or concepts, 
In some sense, the above operations have been 
introduced in such 
ý 
iä 
. +. ý. f1ý1 
Where d is a metric on the sets of concepts satisfying the 
triangle 
inequality. 
e on its own, stands for 'object or morphism elimination'. 
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a way as to accommodate an 'additional function in the non-numeric 
feedback processes, not found in the classic numeric situation; and 
that is the change of the problem description'; MESAROVIC (1970) 
p. 173-74. The latter amounts to the shifting of (problem) represent- 
ation, an issue discussed in the previous chapters. 
One changes a description by 
A. selecting new properties and/or 
B. generating new concepts. 
We are mainly dealing in this work with the second one, otherwise called 
concept formation. 
Besides the above five operations, we next introduce a few 'synthetic' 
ones, namely: >>" 
6. ToEo 
7, Eoý 
8. ýt = TO 
MATRIX1 shows a priority schema during the execution of a synthe- 
sis of e, ý, T operations. MATRIX2 shows the complete situation in 
skeletization when amalgamation is taken also into account. 
MATRIX1 
3c 
ý 
ý 
N 
ý 
ýý 
ýý 
. ý:. 
-ý 
ý 
II 
ý 
MATRIX2 
ýoa 
Eoýoa 
3c 
TOýOa 
TO E0ý0cc 
where #: number' or radiated objects in a k--open involved 
in the conflict. 
3C : there exist conflict. 
'. This is the same as the power of a drasis-set D, 
see sect. 4.3 and 4,2.2,1, 
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AC : there is no conflict. 
various filtrations given earlier. 
e: elimination. 
a: amalgamation. 
T: identification. 
4.7 UTILISATION OF a, ý TO SKELETIZATION 
k-Structures skeletization is described in sect. 3.4, and skeleton 
formation process SFP) in sect. 3.4.2. Here, we deal again with 
skeletization, emphasizing in (A) the role of previously introduced 
a and 4 operations; and (B) the Drasis point(s) and most effective 
drasis (m, e. d. ) notions. 
A. The most important feature in the synthesis stage for Kl, K2-skele- 
tization, is the set of operations is based upon. These operations 
are the means by which skeletization, a k-structure interaction, could 
be thought of as some sort of 'k-space dynamic interaction'. Thus, we 
may characterize operation T as 'exogenous' activity and a, ý, E as 
'endogenous' ones, respectively. 
The outcome of repetitive application of c and especially a, 
among Kl, K2Is ordinary opens and Kl, K2Is fundamental terminals (e. g. 
b, w in sect. 3.3.1 case study) yield the domain (D) and the 
Range (R) of a function: (prec. functor, set 3.1.8) f: D -ý R 
which might be thought of as an embodiment of Kl, K2-skeleton, the 
corner-stone for an analogy. We conceive skeletizations as some 
sort of (concept)-filtering in higher-level''. 
In fact, a skeleton may be thought of as a context of a higher 
abstract ion-level concen 
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Successive applications of a and 4 lead to the formation 
of the fundamental conceptual stones for skeleton; that is, abstracted 
objects and generalized morphisms* between them. 
Takes places between opens 
and when 
P 
conflict situation in which they are involved, i. e. 
opens that they do not belong to a conflict C. 
4 Takes place between opens having different number of objects, 
and which they do belong to a conflict. 
During skeleton synthesis a dilemma occurs: Which course of 
action should be taken first, amalgamation or filtration? We think 
that the correct order is, first filtration and then amalgamation. 
During the (semiotic) similarity matching of two k-opens another 
dilemma appears; nam. between what pair of k-opens should amalgamation 
and/or filtration take place? We believe in this case, that the prio- 
rity is as follows: 
1. object/morphism-elimination (if such an operation is required); 
2. filtration; 
3. amalgamation; 
and the appropriate pairs are found via computational methods described 
in section 3.4. 
B. In order to achieve skeletization when conflict occurs, we 
have 
to 'synthesize' (unify) D1, D2; i. e. the sets of drasis points for 
K1, K2 structures respectively, see also sect. 4.2.2.1. 
For the case 
Are they of the same nature as the parent ones, or another 
semantics is required? This is an open question. 
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study we treat in sect. 4,2,2.1. 
{di, d2 } and 
The above unification inevitably requires elimination. In 
addition, the unification between: 
D1 i. e. K1Is terminal drasis points and 
D2 i. e. K2Is terminal drasis points 
in order to be consistent to initially external posited similarities 
(equivalence relation: LEFT = RIGHT) implies the elimination of 
morphisms attached to the most effective drasis (m. e. d); notions which 
are extensively analysed in sect. 4.3.1. Notice that, as we have seen, 
terminal drasis points are themost important; I think this situation 
is analogous to the following one in arithmetic, nam. 'when comparison 
of two factorizations is attempted, particular attention is given to 
the prime numbers involved in the factorizations'; see also footnote in 
sect. 4.3.1. 
Finally, we point out that the above eliminated morphisms may 
be considered or characterized as 'irrelevant to analogizing' or 'no 
contributing "*or 'redundant' or 'noise' morphisms. Also, the skeleton 
is consistent of: {amalgamations of non-conflicting 
(filtrated) opens) + 
{amalgamations of conflicting (filtrated) opens); results which can 
be illustrated via the schemata of sect. 4.2.2.1. 
An example on the elaboration of 'contributing... 
' is given in 
MELETIS (1975) b. 
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SUMMARY 
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SUMMARY 
In our attempts to investigate the role of analogy in 
problem-solving, learning and concept formation, we arrive at a 
number of interesting results which amount to the development 
of a new representational tool and a methodology involving various 
techniques, which are applied to different problem domains. 
As far as the representation scheme is concerned, we deviced, 
what we call, k-structure to symbolise a variety of situations 
and to represent knowledge. A k-structure consists of objects and 
morphisms and it closely resembles semantic networks and directed 
graphs. Its mathematical background is described in algebraic, 
topological and category theory terms. Among its virtues, are its 
visual appeal, its mathematical clarity and soundness, and the high 
degree of abstraction it offers for conceptualizations between 
similar and even quite distinct Universes of Discourse. Furthermore, 
a number of interpretations are given to its objects and morphisms 
to fit currently existing problem areas in the fields of Cybernetics 
and Artificial Intelligence. Finally, comparisons of k-structure 
vs. existing representational schemes are made; a list of its 
advantages and disadvantages is given, and its computer representations 
are outlined. Furthermore, open questions for future 
investigations 
are put forward. 
On the other hand, the methodology we devised to meet our 
objectives incorporates the following points: 
1.1separation of the context of a concept from the concept 
itself' technique, It is based on the additional organization supplied 
on a k! structure, which amounts to the notion of a 
k-space founded on 
169. 
the idea of what we call k--open; the latter constituents' being the 
centre object, radiated (in/out-going) morphisms and satellite mor- 
phisms. An analysis of a k-open is made from various viewpoints to 
emphasize its importance in the comparisons of k-structures. 
2. ; Skeleton Formation Process' (SFP). It is the cornerstone in 
Analogical Problem-Solving (APS) especially for those which are in 
favour of a reduction approach to PS. In addition, SFP is a fund- 
amental issue to Analogical Learning (AL). A skeleton is conceived 
of as the commonly shared substructure of two parent k--structures in 
algebraic terms. Thus, 'skeletization' becomes a unified theme 
underlying both these two intellectual activities the brain is 
occupied with. 
3. In our efforts to compare k-structures quite often we arrive 
at conflicts and dilemmas, situations which are overcome by devising 
a flexible 'conflict resolution'. technique based, among other things, 
on object and morphism eliminations. Its flexibility is based on 
tact Teal and strategic advisors which may, somehow, be considered as 
the intelligent characteristics of the conflict resolution. 
4. A rather formal account of conflict resolution is provided 
after the introduction of Knowledge Representation Structure (KRS) 
which is considered as an extended k-structure incorporating all of 
its mathematical features. The shift from k-structure to KRS 
is given 
and a schematology for KRS's utilization is provided. 
5. The need to devise a 'conflict resolving clue' led us to the. 
development of what we call 'drasis points', a fundamental attribute 
of a 19ZS, and to the 'most effective drasis' which actually resolves 
a dilemma after a suitable elimination of its morphism environment. 
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6. The need to compare k-spaces resulted in the introduction of a 
number of operations between their constituents. Among the operations 
we arrived at are amalgamation a and filtration 4'. Then utilization 
of 4' and a is made in skeletization. 
7. We have considered a 'concept' as a sequence of similar contexts 
and we proved a proposition about the common understanding of a concept 
from two conversationalists or learners. 
8. Particular attention is also given to shifting between repre- 
sentations (considered as k-structures). Various kinds of shifting 
are proposed and the role of analogy in such shifts is emphasized. 
9. The significance of interaction between problem structure and 
problem solving behaviour is stressed. It is captured in what we 
call 'epistemological-heuristic interaction' which may lead us in the 
future to an epistemologically heuristically adequate shift of repre- 
sentations which has not yet been achieved. 
10. A description of problem-solving is then given in terms of 
k-structures following by a detailed analysis of (APS) for which a 
number of theorem schemata and their interpretation is provided. 
11. We conceive of an analogy as a functor between k-structures. 
The role of analogy in (the mechanization of)shifting of representa- 
tions may be captured in what we call 'Harmonization of skeletons' 
a fundamental cybernetic technique to be developed in the 
future for 
mechanizing analogical intellectual activities. 
Finally, representation and methodology are employed 
in 
WINSTON's (1970) and EVANS? (1963) problem domains to capture and 
illustrate the issues developed in the present thesis. 
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Further hints and suggestions for future investigations 
are scattered throughout the work but we avoid here their 
repetition. 
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APPENDIX 
0.1 SKELALG - COMFUTER PROGRAMME IN NET FORM 
DEADALUS 
0.2 SKELALG - IN TREE FORM 
KOSMOS 
MARV 
ARIADNI, THESEUS, DEADALUS, CANTOR 
SKELALG KRISIS 
< 
RunP A KAPPA_ RIV y-" I vaµua' .... r ý .. ý 7 -- . 
GME 
GFUZZIF FUZZY 
', EIGHT 
LFUZZIF P"2: 
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11 ON SUBROUTINES 
KOSMOS subroutine. Its purpose is the construction of the (Level-1) 
context of every object, i. e. Eon composition. KOSMOS implements 
step 3 in the discussion on pairing off objects (Sect. 3.3.3). It 
receives a k-structure and outputs contexts, which we called 
k-opens, with some extra information used in the comparison stage. 
KOSMOS' output, called k-space serves for the comparison step in 
skeleton formation process (SFP). 
2. TECHNICAL POINTS 
2,0 Introduction 
The following short notes are about the nature of concepts GME, 
LME, MARV, EMARV, BIV, RNORMA, and LAC matrix. Some of them constitute 
the basis for a variety of similarity measures for k-opens in a 
k-space. Their mathematical formula is given and an account for their 
raison d'etre is outlined. The main references for this section are: 
WINSTOI (1970), GLUSHKOV (1966), HALPERN (1975), ZADEH (1973), 
KOWALSKI (1975), EVANS (1963), BARNDEN (1975) and MELETIS (1977)a, b. 
Next, an analysis is given of the implemented, via SKELALG 
computer programme, concepts: 
1, Global Morphism Emphasis: GMEc (0,1) 
2. Local Morphism Emphasis : LMEE (0,1) 
3. Means for Adjacency Representation Vector: MARV e 
R3 
4, Extended MARV : EMARV C R4 
5. Boundary Index Vector: BIV 
6, RNORP'IA : BIV rs norm. 
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This note is a detailed account for dilemma 1, outlined in 
MELETIS (1977)a, p. 14. Having the purpose of bringing about a 
connection between k--opens, i. e. k-spaces' ingredients, we found 
that hints (as guides for k-opens' similarity/adjacency/connectivity) 
might be devised from the contribution of radiated objects and mor- 
-phisms, and of satellite ones, that is, the constituents for a k-open. 
GME, LME, MARV, and EMARV offer the basis for introducing some kind 
of variety of similarity measures, which is, in some sense, absent 
in WINSTON (1970) implementation; and as he points out, "the crea- 
tion of a manifold of similarity hints, would provide with greater 
flexibility the decision making process", during the course of compari- 
son, i. e. "off the cuff" alternative similarity measures would be in 
"off the shelf" manner available, facilitating thus the resolution 
for conflicts, during various processes, especially amalgamation and 
filtration, which are vital to skeletization (and harmonization). 
Noteworthy, EVANS (1963) uses some, but limited, variety of alternative 
similarity measures. Finally, the flavour of GME and LME is to give 
a distinct colour to each morphism. That is, they might be thought 
of as interpretations, nam. global and local resp. 
2.1 GME 
Global Morphism Emphasis is defined as 
GME :M3 (O, 1)GR 
M r--; GME 
(m): = 
0(m) 
TNOM 
where, M; morphisms; mEM, 0(m): occurrences of morphism 
m in a k-structure; 
and TNOM: total number of morphisms; R: real numbers. 
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For WINSTONIs analogy type example we found; 
STRUCTURE 1 STRUCTURE 2 
GME(ml)=. 412 GME(Ml)=. 500 
GME(m2)=. 176 GME(m2)=. 167 
GME(m3)=, 118 GME(m3)=. 0 
GME(m4)=. 294 GME(m4)=. 333 
For normalisation is valid: Z GME(m. )=1, i=1,2,3,4, k=1.2. 
ý 1___- 
raison d'etre: the values of GME function may be taken as some kind of 
colour to a morphism or morphism's weight (MW) or fuzzy value (MFV), 
by means of which fuzzification (from global point of view) of k-space's 
opens is feasible, and therefore assignement of quantitative, thus 
computable, features to k-opens is achievable. One of them, for 
example, is the weight of a k-open given by: 
B 
W SW 
TNOP"1 + TNOM 
where, W: weight of radiated morphism 
SW : weight of satellite morphisms. 
Via GME the fuzzy k-space for some of WINSTON's structures is computed. 
2.2 LME 
Local morphism emphasis is defined as 
LME: M (0,1)C R 
;m «-ý LMF(m): = 2ý 
TR + TS 
-where, R: occurrences of radiated morphism m 
TR: total no. of radiated rrorphisms 
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TS : total no. of satellite morphisms 
S: satellite occurrences of in, 
Nature of LME: relative contribution of radiated and satellite 
morphisms to a k-open. 
Ralson dretre: LME is served as a kind of hint for similarity 
comparisons. As from its nature implies, LME leads to a local feature 
for each k-open. That is the open's weight from local point of view. 
Implications: LME is used for computing connectivity/adjacency measures 
Dl, D15, D2, see MELETIS (1977)a, b. 
Via LME the local fuzzification of k-space leads to a fuzzy k-space 
computable by SKELALG computer programme. 
2.3 MARV, EMARV, BIV, RNORMA 
The above are defined as: 
BIV : OPENS --ý R3 
X : --ý BIV(X): =(I1, I2, I3), for every non-isolated 
object 
where, 
I1: = TNT , 
RO : radiated objects, TNO; total no, of objects in 
the k-open 
I2: = 
RM 
, RM : radiated morphisms, 
TNOM: total no, of morphisms 
TNOM 
I3. - 
SM 
, SM : satellite morghisms. TNOM 
An object is called jsolated iff it does not 
have radiated ingoing or 
outgoing morphisms. 
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MARV : OPENS ---) R+ 
X MARV(X): = NORMA(BIV), 
where, NORMA(BIV): = (11)2 + (12)2 + (13)2 
EMARV := NORMA (EBIV) 
where, EBIV: = (I1,121, I22, I3). 121,122 symbolise resp. the no. of 
ingoing and outgoing morphism. 
MARV may be interpreted as 'the object's distance from isolation', which 
features a k-open (qualitative feature). Via MARV or EMARV, various 
fuzzifications for a k--space of a given k-structure are computationally 
feasible. 
MARV,, BIV, NORMA are used for expressing ISOL1, ISOL2, ISOL3, which 
is another triple for structural/quantitative set adjacency of k-opens; 
for example 
ISOL2(CX, CY): = 
x. y. 
IMARVx. 
-MARVy 
1. ý1] 
xýt CX, yjE CY . 
3.11 GLOBAL FUZZIFIER 
Computes the global emphasis of each morphism, for all 
k-opens. 
Then it fuzzifies k-space's constituents, assigning to each morphism 
its global emphasis. GFUZZIF uses FUZZY, GME, 
WEIGHT subroutines. 
3,2 LOCAL FUZZIFIER 
Computes the local emphasis of each morphism 
for each open. Then 
it fuzzifies k-space, assigning to each morphism 
its local. emphasis, 
which generally varies from open to open. 
LFUZZIF uses FUZZY, R`E, WEIGH' 
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